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In my dissertation, I explore how managerial attributes affect corporate policies.  
In my first essay, I examine the effects of public firm CEOs’ prior private equity (PE) target 
experiences on corporate policies. Based on difference-in-differences and propensity score 
matching analyses, public firm CEOs previously serving as CEOs in PE targets reduce investment 
by about 15 percent while enhancing patent values by over 7 percent after taking office compared 
to CEOs without such experiences. The effects are stronger if these CEOs (1) worked in targets 
invested by more reputable PE firms, (2) worked in targets invested by PE firms known for 
implementing significant capital investment cuts or for enhancing innovation, and (3) have more 
recent and longer PE target experiences. These CEOs also cut employment, enhance firm value, 
and increase leverage. 
 In my second essay, I examine whether and how the managerial ability of customer firms 
affects their suppliers. Following the event where a more able CEO takes office in the customer 
firm, the percentile rank of supplier’s managerial ability increases by 12, while the percentile rank 
of supplier’s total firm efficiency (i.e., the ability to generate sales from a given set of inputs) 
increases by 10. The effects are stronger if (1) the supplier is financially constrained, (2) the 
supplier is in the industry that is more vertically related with its customer industry, (3) the supplier 
is in the industry that shares similar technology space with its customer industry, (4) the customer 
firm CEOs are hired from within the same industry, (5) the supplier is more important to its 
customer in term of the proportion of the customer’s cost of goods sold (COGS) accounted for by 
the supplier, (6) the customer-supplier relationship lasts longer, and (7) the managers in the 
supplier firms were previously socially connected with managers in the customer firms. 




and enhances firm value after more-able customer CEOs take office. Overall, these findings 
provide evidence of positive spillover effects of managerial ability in the supply chain.  
In my third essay, I study the effects of the social network connections of chief technology 
officers (CTOs) on corporate innovation. I find that firms with better connected CTOs invest more 
in research and development (R&D), receive more patents, and attract more patent citations. In 
addition to the general network centrality, the professional network centrality of CTOs constructed 
based on the sample of CTOs also fosters firm innovation. Further tests show that firms innovate 
more if the CTOs are hired by the incumbent CEOs. Finally, I provide evidence indicating that 
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There are several ways managers can acquire skills and valuation information. In my dissertation, 
I examine how the managerial attributes propagate through on-job training, interactions along the 
supply chain, or social networks.  Specifically, I have three essays that examine whether managers 
imprint their prior management styles on the current firms they are running, whether supplier 
managers can improve their managerial ability by learning from their more able customer 
managers, and whether the managers can gain valuable information via social network connections, 
respectively.  
Managers’ prior professional experiences might affect current firms’ policies and 
performance. In my first essay, “Managing with Private Equity Style: CEOs’ Prior Buyout Target 
Experiences and Corporate Policies”, I study whether and how managers’ prior private equity (PE) 
target experiences influence corporate policies. Prior literature documents that, on the one hand, 
PE firms slim down the organization, eliminate jobs, achieve better innovations, adopt higher 
leverage, and that, on the other hand, PE firms improve financial performance for their target firms. 
Therefore, CEOs who previously worked in the PE targets might find the management styles of 
private equity beneficial and apply them in the subsequent companies they are running. I find that 
public firm CEOs previously serving as CEOs of PE targets reduce investment while enhancing 
patent values after taking office compared to CEOs without such experiences. The effects are 
stronger if these CEOs (1) worked in targets invested by more reputable PE firms, (2) worked in 
targets invested by PE firms known for implementing significant capital investment cuts or for 
enhancing innovation, and (3) have more recent and longer PE target experiences. Besides, I find 




Managers might improve their managerial ability by learning from their stakeholders. In 
my second essay, “Spillover Effects of Managerial Ability in the Supply Chain”, I study whether 
and how the managerial ability of customer firms affects their suppliers. The existing literature 
shows that economic link in the supply chain is often characterized by relationship-specific 
investments and repeated interactions and requires a high level of coordination. Therefore, supplier 
managers can enhance their managerial ability by learning from their more able customer 
managers. I find that following the event where a more able CEO takes office in the customer firm, 
both the managerial ability and the firm efficiency (the ability to generate sales from a given set 
of inputs) of the supplier increase. The effects are stronger if (1) the supplier is financially 
constrained, (2) the supplier is in the industry that is more vertically related with its customer 
industry, (3) the supplier is in the industry that shares similar technology space with its customer 
industry, (4) the customer firm CEOs are hired from within the same industry, (5) the supplier is 
more important to its customer in term of the proportion of the customer’s cost of goods sold 
(COGS) accounted for by the supplier, (6) the customer-supplier relationship lasts longer, and (7) 
the managers in the supplier firms were previously socially connected with managers in the 
customer firms. Furthermore, the supplier firm improves earnings quality, boosts credit ratings, 
increases leverage, and enhances firm value after more-able customer CEOs take office. 
Managers may gain valuable information through social network connections. In my third 
essay, “CTO Network Centrality and Corporate Innovation”, I examine whether the social network 
connections of chief technology officers (CTOs) affect corporate innovation. Outside sources of 
knowledge are critical to firm innovation. A better-connected CTO has access to more valuable 
information, such as the most recent technology knowledge, ideas, trends, etc., thus fostering 




development (R&D), generate more patents, and attract more patent citations. The results hold for 
both the general network centrality calculated based on the universe of BoardEx and the 
professional network centrality calculated based on a subsample of CTOs. 





Managing with Private Equity Style: CEOs’ Prior Buyout Target Experiences and Corporate 
Policies, with Hung-Chia Scott Hsu and Tomas Jandik
5 
1. Introduction
Finance research has extensively studied whether and how private equity (PE) firms influence their 
buyout target firms. According to Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), PE firms “use their industry and 
operating knowledge…to develop value creation plans for those investments, and to implement 
the value creation plans. A plan might include elements of cost-cutting opportunities and 
productivity improvements, strategic changes or repositioning, acquisition opportunities, as well 
as management changes and upgrades.” Consistent with this view, PE is documented to improve 
target firms’ operational practices (Bernstein and Sheen (2016), Cohn, Nestoriak, and Wardlaw 
(2019)), enhance productivity (Davis, Haltiwanger, Handley, Jarmin, Lerner, and Miranda (2014), 
Bharath, Dittmar, and Sivadasan (2014), Davis, Haltiwanger, Handley, Lipsius, Lerner, and 
Miranda (2019)), cut existing jobs while creating new jobs (Davis et al. (2014), Faccio and Hsu 
(2017), Davis et al. (2019)), achieve better innovations (Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2011)), 
and launch new products and geographical expansions (Fracassi, Previtero, and Sheen (2019)). It 
is thus not surprising that PE firms improve financial performance for their target firms (Kaplan 
(1989), Cohn and Towery (2013), Acharya, Gottschalg, Hahn, and Kehoe (2013)) and schools they 
fund (Eaton, Howell, and Yannelis (2019)). 
Despite the extensive discussions and evidence in the literature regarding the effects of PE 
on their target firms, it is far less clear whether and how these PE effects extend beyond the target 
firms. The answers to this question provide important policy implications, especially in light of 
the growing attention by policy makers to overhaul and closely scrutinize the private equity 
industry.1 This paper aims to answer this question by examining the spillover effects of PE in a 
1 For example, Senate Elizabeth Warren proposed the Stop Wall Street Looting Act, which imposes a 100% tax on 
fees paid from companies to the PE firms that buy them, prohibit dividends or other cash extractions for two years 
after an acquisition, and increase disclosures to investors. See https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-08-
05/elizabeth-warren-s-private-equity-plan-gets-one-big-thing-wrong.
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novel setting, i.e., to investigate whether and how public firm chief executive officers’ (CEOs) 
prior work experiences in PE buyout targets help shape corporate policies and performance of 
these CEOs’ current firms. To the best of our knowledge, the present research is the first to study 
the effects of prior professional experiences associated with PE. In addition, since the seminal 
work by Bertrand and Schoar (2003), who show that manager fixed effects explain a variety of 
corporate outcomes,  extensive finance research has studied the effect of CEOs’ personal attributes 
and traits on firm policies and performance. However, our paper is among the first to investigate 
the role of prior “on-job training” gained via repeated interactions with experienced finance 
advisors and monitors, i.e., PE sponsor firms.2 
There are several reasons why prior PE buyout target experiences might matter for 
corporate policies and performance. First, the abovementioned literature suggests that PE firms 
implement strong operating initiatives on their target firms, thus improving performance and 
creating economic value. In addition, Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2015) document that PE 
targets have significantly better management practices than almost all other ownership groups, 
including family-run, founder-owned, or government-owned firms. Therefore, CEOs may find the 
managing style of PE beneficial and apply it to their current firms. Furthermore, PE firms usually 
take full control over their target firms, actively manage these targets, and place extremely high 
2 The CEO personal attributes and traits studied in the context of financial policies and performance include, for 
example, overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012), Goel and Thakor 
(2008)), optimism (Otto (2014)), personal characteristics (Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2012)), personal traits 
(Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013), Davidson, Dey, and Smith (2015)), sensation seeking (Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2009); Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang (2017), Brown, Lu, Ray, and Teo (2018)), gender (Tate and Yang (2015)), personal 
attitudes toward gender (Duchin, Simutin, and Sosyura (2020)), family environment (Cronqvist and Yu (2017)), 
personal connections (El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik (2015)), early-life exposures to fatal disasters (Bernile, Bhagwat, 
and Rau (2017)), early-life exposures to recession (Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2013)), hurricane experiences (Dessaint 
and Matray (2017)), off-the-job behavior (Davidson, Dey, and Smith (2015)), cultural heritage (Nguyen, Hagendorff, 
and Eshraghi (2018)), inventor experience (Islam and Zein (2019)), political affiliation (Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar 
(2014)), political preferences (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014), Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar (2014)), signature size 
(Ham, Seybert, and Wang (2017)), military service (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011), Benmelech and Frydman 
(2015)), and personal financing decisions (Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker (2012)).  
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standard and scrutiny on CEOs of PE target firms. According to a recent Wall Street Journal article 
on CEOs of PE buyout target firms, “Executives can make their mark…by becoming the leader of 
a company owned by private-equity investors…Senior managers risk career derailment if they 
can't handle the strict personal accountability, intense scrutiny and speedy decisions that private-
equity firms often demand.”3 Therefore, the resulting intensive work experiences in the PE buyout 
targets may leave a footprint on a CEO’s management style that may later be observed in the 
subsequent firms he or she is running.  
If a CEO’s prior PE target experiences matter for corporate policies and performance of 
the current firms, how do they matter? One of the primary initiatives PE firms implement on their 
target firms pertains to cost cutting and slim-downs of the organizations (Kaplan (1989), Gompers, 
Kaplan, and Mukharlyamov (2016), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990)). In addition to cost cutting, 
PE firms focus on the long-term growth and competitiveness of their targets through the pursuit of 
valuable innovations (Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2011)). They also create economic values 
for their targets (Kaplan (1989), Cohn and Towery (2013), Acharya et al. (2013)). Finally, in a 
typical PE transaction, PE firms acquire target firms with 60 to 90 percent of debt and 10 to 40 
percent of equity (Kaplan (1989), Kaplan and Strömberg (2009)). High leverage incentivizes 
managers to work more efficiently and to be more aligned with shareholders’ interests (Jensen 
(1986)). CEOs who previously worked in the PE targets may thus follow these initiatives taken by 
PE firms by cutting capital expenditures, reducing employment, developing valuable innovations, 
creating economic values, and raising leverage.  
To test these conjectures, we utilize the Boardex database as well as hand-collected data 
on CEOs of all US public firms from 2000 to 2018. We track the employment history of these 
3 See https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-the-ceo-reports-to-private-equity-bosses-1464117859.
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CEOs and identify whether the firms for which these CEOs previously worked have gone through 
leverage buyout (LBO), management buyout (MBO), or going private transaction by PE firms. 
We identify 209 public firms whose CEOs previously worked for PE buyout targets and assumed 
the position of CEO, who plays the most important role in the decision making of all the major 
policy and operation decisions. One such example is Steve Easterbrook, who previously worked 
as the CEO in Wagamama, a PE target company. He was hired as the CEO of McDonald's since 
March 2015. By 2017, he reduced capital expenditures by 27 percent, eliminated 185,000 
employees, increased the firm’s leverage by 11.7 percent, and enhanced the firm’s Tobin’s Q by 
42 percent.  
We adopt the difference-in-differences (DID) framework to test for the effects of the 
CEO’s prior PE target experiences on focal public firms’ changes in capital expenditures, 
employment, patent values, i.e., the market reactions to the announcement of patent grants, as 
proposed by Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017), Tobin’s Q, and leverage within 
five years before to five years after these CEOs take office. We further use propensity score 
matching methods to find a control firm that shares similar characteristics with the treatment firms, 
but that does not hire a CEO with prior PE buyout experiences.  
We document that our sample companies significantly underperform the market prior to 
the new CEO appointment. Importantly, the propensity score matching results in the selection of 
the set of control companies that underperform the market similarly to our sample firms, 
suggesting that both the focal sample and control firms may benefit from the management change. 
In particular, the median industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q of the focal public firms (control firms) in 
the year before the hiring of these CEOs is -0.139 (-0.169). Both values are significantly negative 




the focal public firms (control firms) experience negative industry abnormal stock returns within 
12 months prior to the hiring of these CEOs.  
We first examine the effects of CEOs’ prior PE target experiences on focal public firms’ 
investment and employment policies. Consistent with cost cutting as one of the primary initiatives 
of PE firms, focal public firms with CEOs who previously worked as the CEOs of PE targets tend 
to cut more capital expenditures and employment than a matched sample of firms with similar 
characteristics, but hiring CEOs without prior PE target experiences. These effects are 
economically significant: On average, the focal firm CEOs who used to be the CEOs in the PE 
targets reduce capital expenditures by 14.9 percent and cut employment by 6.8 percent per year 
within five years after taking office, compared to the control firms with CEOs without prior PE 
target experiences.  
We next investigate how CEOs’ prior PE target experiences relate to the enhancement of 
valuable innovations and value creation for the focal public firms. We do so by analyzing the 
effects on the focal public firms’ patent values as well as Tobin’s Q. PE targets are typically private 
companies that have more incentives to explore innovative ideas instead of exploiting existing 
ideas (Ferreira, Manso, and Silva (2014)). Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2011) further show 
that PE targets indeed develop patents with better qualities, i.e., patents that receive more citations. 
In addition to encouraging innovations, PE is also documented to pursue growth and value creation 
(Boucly, Sraer, and Thesmar (2011)). CEOs who previously worked in the PE targets may thus 
follow the managing styles of emphasizing developing valuable innovations and value creation. 
Consistent with these conjectures, we indeed find that public firms with CEOs previously serving 
as the CEOs of PE targets generate higher patent values and Tobin’s Q than the matched control 




economically significant: On average, the focal firm CEOs with prior PE buyout target experiences 
increase patent values by 7.4 percent and Tobin’s Q by 6.6 percent per year within five years after 
they take office compared to the control sample of firms. These results are consistent with value 
improvements as a major initiative PE firms implement in their target firms. 
Finally, consistent with one of the main initiative of PE that increases firm leverage, we 
find that firms with CEOs who previously worked as CEOs in PE buyout targets are associated 
with a higher debt-to-asset ratios, suggesting the potential spillover effects of PE managing style 
on the financial policies of the CEOs’ current public firms. 
As cost cutting and developing valuable innovations are two of the most important 
initiatives PE firms implement on target firms, we conduct four further cross-sectional tests to 
better understand the underlying mechanisms of the effects of CEOs’ prior PE target experiences 
on focal public firms’ investment policies and patent values. These cross-sectional tests are 
described as follows.  
First, we document that CEOs who worked in PE targets invested by more reputable PE 
firms are associated with more capital expenditure reductions and higher patent values after they 
take office in the focal public firms. More reputable PE firms accumulate more experiences in 
successfully managing and restructuring their target firms, and may therefore exhibit a stronger 
managing style of slimming down capital expenditures as well as fostering more valuable 
innovations of the target firms. 
Second, we find that CEOs who managed targets invested by PE firms that typically cut 
capital expenditures or promote research and development (R&D) tend to display the same 
investment and innovative tendencies when subsequently serving as CEOs of public focal firms. 




capital expenditures scaled by total assets and (2) the mean R&D expenditures scaled by total sales 
of all going-private transactions invested by the same PE firm within ten years before it invests in 
the target for which the CEO in question worked. These measures aim to gauge the PE firm’s 
preferences with respect to the capital expenditures and R&D expenditures of their targets before 
investing in the target for which the CEO in question worked. We then rank all PE targets based 
on both PE firm preference measures and define targets whose PE firm preference measures are 
above (below) the median of the sample as those in the high (low) capital expenditure and R&D 
cohorts. Following the cost cutting initiatives of private equity, PE firms that prefer investing in 
targets with more capital expenditures before LBO may be more prone to cutting investment after 
the buyout.4 Similarly, PE firms that prefer investing in targets with higher R&D expenditures 
before LBO may help target firms generate higher patent values. As such, CEOs who were under 
these types of PE firms may develop managing styles of cost cutting and pursuing more valuable 
innovations.  
Third, we show that CEOs who have more recent PE target experiences, where the recency 
of the CEO’s PE target experiences is measured by the time between the CEO leaving the PE target 
and subsequent starting in the focal public firm, are associated with deeper cost-cutting and 
stronger innovation activities in their new companies. The more recently the CEO worked in a PE 
target, the more likely he or she follows the managing practices and styles with the PE targets and 
applies them to the focal public firms.  
Finally, we provide evidence that the duration of the CEO’s prior PE target work 
 
4 The ideal PE firm preference measure (toward investment policies) is constructed using the change in capital 
expenditures for all targets invested by the PE firm before the PE firm invests in the target with which the CEO had 
work experiences. However, since the majority of the PE targets are private firms whose financial data are unavailable, 
we construct the PE firm preference measure based on the sample of going private transactions conducted by the PE 




experiences has a positive relation with focal public firms’ cost-cutting and patent values. The 
longer the CEO worked in a PE target, the more likely the footprint of the PE managing styles is 
branded into the CEO’s styles in managing the focal public firms. 
Collectively, our findings support the “managing with PE style” effects with regard to both 
the cost cutting and innovation enhancement initiatives of private equity, and thus provide a 
potential reason why the focal public firms hire CEOs with prior PE target experiences. Since these 
firms underperform, they need these CEOs to manage with PE styles, i.e., to cut costs and to 
improve values. Importantly, we document these significant changes only for our focal sample 
firms, and not for the control companies, which – despite similar initial underperformance – did 
not hire managers with PE experiences. We also find evidence that the cost-cutting and innovation-
enhancing activities of new CEOs with prior PE experiences are likely not associated with 
potentially unobservable personal characteristics and traits of those managers that could facilitate 
cost-cutting and/or innovation management tendencies. 
Our study is related to the following strands of literature. First, we extend the literature on 
the effects and importance of PE. In addition to the aforementioned studies documenting the effects 
of PE on the operational and value improvements of target firms, PE also enhances the human 
capital of employees in the target firms (Agrawal and Tambe (2016)), facilitates more favorable 
loan terms (Ivashina and Kovner (2011)), reduces agency costs (Cornelli, Kominek, and 
Ljungqvist (2013), Edgerton (2012)), improves corporate governance (Acharya  et al. (2013)), and 
resolves financial distress more efficiently for target firms (Hotchkiss, Strömberg, and Smith 
(2014)). While the existing finance research has documented many aspects of the importance of 
PE to the target firms, this paper is the first to show that experiences managers gain through their 




Second, our paper builds on the literature linking corporate policies and performance to 
CEOs’ prior professional experiences. These experiences include prior work experiences in the 
firm’s divisions (Xuan (2009)), industry expertise (Custódio and Metzger (2013)), finance 
expertise (Custódio and Metzger (2014)), distress experiences (Dittmar and Duchin (2016)), 
general abilities developed through working in different positions and industries (Custódio, 
Ferreira, and Matos (2013, 2019)), and economic recessions experiences (Schoar and Zuo (2017)). 
Our study is the first to study a special type of professional experience – CEOs’ previous 
employment by PE targets – and shows that it indeed affects corporate policies and performance 
of the current firms. Finally, our study also extends the aforementioned broad literature that 
examines how CEOs, and their personal characteristics and traits, affect corporate policies and 
performance.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data. Section 3 discusses the 
empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and sample description 
This section describes the data source and presents the main summary statistics. 
 
2.1. Data 
We utilize the Boardex database to identify all individuals who held the CEO positions in the US 
public firms between 2000 and 2018 and were appointed to those positions since 1996. For each 
CEO in the list, we obtain the chronology of his or her job histories, including the dates when the 
CEO was hired in the focal public firm as well as all companies they have previously worked for. 




and Acquisitions Database and track whether the firms for which the CEO previously worked 
experienced leveraged buyouts (LBOs), management buyouts (MBOs), or going-private 
transactions.  
For focal public firms, we exclude financial firms (SIC Codes 6000 – 6999) and utility 
firms (SIC Codes 4900 – 4999), as well as firms that do not survive within one year after the CEO 
takes office. Since the CEOs are the principal decision makers of a firms’ operations and policies, 
we conjecture that the effects of “managing with PE style,” if any, are stronger for CEOs who 
assumed the same job in the PE targets. The final sample consists of 209 public firm CEOs who 
previously held the position of CEOs in the PE targets.  
A further investigation of the sample of these 209 public firm CEOs reveals that the mean 
and median enterprise values (EV; the market value of equity plus net debt) of the sample public 
firms at the time when these CEOs take office are $5.21 billion and $833 million, respectively. 
These numbers are, on average, substantially higher than the values of typical PE targets in Capital 
IQ. For example, the median EV of the sample public firm is in the 90th percentile of EVs of all 
PE targets in Capital IQ. In addition, in untabulated analyses, we find that the sample mean 
(median) EV is very similar to that of the largest 250 (1,000) PE targets invested during our sample 
period.5 Altogether, the above evidence suggests that a reasonably high proportion of sufficiently 
large PE target CEOs ultimately become the CEOs of public firms.  
We obtain firm accounting information from Compustat and the stock price information 
from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We follow Kogan et al. (2017) and measure 
the value of patents based on stock market reactions to patent grants. Data on patent values are 
 
5 The comparison of the sample public firms and the PE target where our CEOs worked before taking over the focal 
public firms yields similar results. In fact, the median EV of those PE targets is in the 80th percentile of EVs of all PE 
targets in Capital IQ. Also, the mean (median) EV of these PE targets is very similar to that of the largest 1,500 (1,800) 




obtained from Noah Stoffman’s website (https://kelley.iu.edu/nstoffma/). 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the time distribution of the year in which the CEOs who 
previously assumed the CEO positions in the PE targets take office in the focal public firms. Ten 
CEOs were hired in the 1990s, while the numbers of CEOs with past work experiences in the PE 
target firms are evenly spaced across years after 2000. Panel B reports the distribution of the period 
between the time when the executive leaves the PE targets and the time when he or she assumes 
the CEO position in the focal public firm. 65.6% (94.7%) of executives are hired as CEOs within 
three (nine) years after they leave the PE targets.  
2.2. Construction of the control group and summary statistics 
To mitigate the concerns over endogenous matching between CEOs with PE target experiences 
and the focal public firms, we identify a sample of control public firms that share similar 
characteristics with the treatment firms, but that hire CEOs who previously held the CEO positions 
in non-PE-backed firms in the same year and industry as the treatment firms do. Specifically, for 
the full treatment sample, we use a propensity score matching (PSM) approach by estimating the 
following Probit model:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝐸 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 1|𝑋𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼𝑡 +  𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 +
𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−1 +
𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1+ 𝛽8𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (1) 
The time subscript t refers to the year when the CEO is hired by the public firm. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if a CEO with prior PE target experiences is 
hired and 0 if a CEO without such experiences is hired. The independent variables include firm 
size (the natural logarithm of total book value of assets), leverage (the ratio of total book value of 




total book value of assets), return on assets (ROA; the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total book value of assets), Tobin’s Q (the ratio of 
market value of assets (total assets plus market capitalization minus book equity) to total book 
value of assets), sales growth (the percentage increase in total sales from the previous year), CEO 
age, and a graduate degree indicator that takes the value of one if the CEO has a graduate degree.  
We match each treatment firm with a control firm with the closest propensity score and 
that hires a CEO in the same year and industry as the treatment firm. To mitigate the survivorship 
bias problem, we restrict that the control firms survive at least as long as the treatment firms. 
In untabulated analyses, we consider many alternative specifications of PSMs – both with 
and without CEO characteristics. The signs and magnitudes of coefficients based on these 
alternative matching models are similar to those reported in the paper. Table 2 reports the mean 
firm and CEO characteristics (in the year before the CEOs take office) for both the treatment and 
the control groups. Both the firm and CEO characteristics between the treatment and control 
samples are very similar, and the p-values of the differences between the two groups are 
insignificant.  In addition, we find that both focal and control firms comparably underperform their 
respective industries prior to the CEO succession, suggesting that both focal and control firms 
likely face similar needs for a managerial change. In particular, the median (Fama-French 48) 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q of the focal public firms (control firms) in the year before the hiring 
of these CEOs is -0.139 (-0.169). Both values are significantly negative at the one percent level, 
while insignificantly different from each other. In addition, 72% (71%) of the focal public firms 
(control firms) experience negative industry abnormal stock returns within 12 months prior to the 





3. Empirical results 
In this section, we report empirical results of the effects of CEOs’ prior PE target work experiences 
on corporate policies and performance. In particular, we analyze the following difference-in-
differences (DID) framework:  
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑡 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 𝑖,𝑡                                         
(2)    
Dependent Variable is a particular corporate policy or a performance variable, as 
mentioned in the introduction, for public firm i in year t. The estimation window starts within five 
years before to five years after the CEO takes office. We further exclude the year in which the 
CEO takes office in the estimations.  
Our main explanatory variable of interest is the interaction term Treatment*After. 
Treatment takes the value of one if the CEO previously served as the CEO of a PE target, and zero 
otherwise. After takes the value of one if the time of the observation is within five years after the 
CEO takes office. In what follows, we describe in detail the effects of CEOs’ prior PE buyout 
target experiences on focal public firms’ corporate policies and performance. In these analyses, 
we include both firm and year fixed effects to control for potential time invariant unobservable 
firm characteristics as well as time trends that might bias our results. Finally, we cluster the 
standard errors at the firm level to account for time-series correlations within the firm.  
3.1. Effects of prior PE target experiences on investment and employment 
To examine whether CEOs with prior PE target work experiences follow the cost cutting initiatives 
of PE (e.g., Kaplan (1989), Gompers, Kaplan, and Mukharlyamov (2016), Lichtenberg and Siegel 




Table 3 reports the DID regression results of the effects on the ratio of capital expenditures 
over total assets. In Model (1), the control variables include an interaction term Treatment*After, 
After, additional firm characteristics, as well as firm and year fixed effects. The set of firm control 
characteristics variables is based on those adopted in Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003). In 
particular, we include Tobin’s Q, the ratio of cash flows to total assets, and the interaction between 
Tobin’s Q and the Kaplan-Zingales financial constraint index developed by Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997). In addition, we also control for the logarithm of total sales and the tangibility ratio. In 
Model (2), we control for additional CEO characteristics, including CEO age, a graduate degree 
indicator equal to one if the CEO has a graduate degree, CEO tenure, and gender. In both models, 
the coefficients of the interaction term Treatment*After are negative and significant, suggesting 
that CEOs with prior PE target experiences in the same position are associated with more capital 
expenditure cuts – i.e. the same type of behavior documented for the actual top executives of PE 
targets by e.g. Kaplan (1989) and Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990). These findings thus provide the 
first piece of evidence regarding the PE managing style effects on investment policies. The results 
are not only statistically significant but also economically significant: On average, public firm 
CEOs who previously held the CEO positions in PE targets reduce investment by 14.9 percent 
within five years after being appointed as the CEOs, compared to a matched sample of CEOs 
without such experiences.6,7 
Kaplan (1989) and Harris, Siegel, and Wright (2005) show that PE targets tend to 
significantly reduce employment. Next, we thus investigate the potential similar effects of CEOs’ 
 
6 The 14.9 percent decrease is obtained by dividing the coefficient Treatment*After in the regressions reported in 
Model (2) of Table 3 by the mean ratio of capital expenditures to total assets of the sample in the year before the CEOs 
are hired.  
7 In unreported analysis, we find that capital expenditures are reduced more by CEOs who participated in 86 public-
to-private transactions. Davis et al. (2019) document similar results for the capital spending adjustments in the actual 




prior PE buyout target experiences on employment. We report the DID analysis results in Table 4. 
The dependent variable is the number of employees, and we control for a similar set of firm 
characteristics variables as those used in Faccio and Hsu (2017). As in Table 3, we utilize only 
firm characteristics in Model (1), while we analyze the impacts of both firm and CEO 
characteristics in Model (2). Our findings suggest that firms with CEOs who previously assumed 
the CEO position in the PE buyout targets significantly decrease employment after these CEOs 
take office, as the coefficient on Treatment*After is significantly negative for both models. These 
results further support the potential PE managing style effects in slimming down corporations. In 
addition, the measured effects are not only statistically significant but also economically 
significant: On average, public firm CEOs who previously held the CEO positions in PE targets 
reduce employment by 6.8 percent within five years after taking the CEO positions compared to a 
matched sample of CEOs without such experiences.8 
3.2. Effects of prior PE target experiences on patent values  
To pursue long-term growth and competitiveness of PE buyout target firms, another well-
documented initiative adopted by PE firms pertains to the development of valuable innovations 
(Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2011)). CEOs with prior PE buyout target experiences may 
thus follow this initiative when they manage the focal public firms. We measure firm innovative 
output using the patent value measure proposed by Kogan et al. (2017). This patent value measure 
is based on stock market reactions to patent grants. According to Kogan et al. (2017), this measure 
provides the benefits of gauging the quality of patents using the dollar values of patents, which 
make the value of innovations comparable across time and industry. This measure thus provides 
an ideal setting in this paper to analyze the (dollar) value created through valuable innovations.  
 
8 The 6.8 percent decrease is obtained by dividing the coefficient Treatment*After in the regressions reported in Model 




 Table 5 reports the results of the DID analyses of the measured effects on firm’s patent 
values. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the average market value of 
the patents applied for in a given year around CEO successions. In addition to the main variables 
of interest, i.e., After and Treatment*After, we use a similar control set of firm variables as He and 
Tian (2013).9 The interaction term Treatment*After is positive and significant in both models. This 
result suggests that, following CEO turnover, firms with CEOs who previously held the CEO 
positions in the PE buyout targets have higher patent values than a matched sample of firms hiring 
CEOs without PE target experiences. The measured effects are also economically significant: On 
average, public firm CEOs who previously held the CEO positions in PE targets increase patent 
values by 7.4 percent within five years after taking the CEO positions compared to a matched 
sample of CEOs without such experiences.10,11 
3.3. Effects of prior PE target experiences on the overall firm value 
So far, we have documented evidence that CEOs of public firms with prior PE buyout target 
experiences tend to cut capital spending and employment, as well as develop valuable innovations 
that generate higher stock values. We next examine whether these CEOs indeed create firm value 
– proxied by Tobin’s Q – for the focal public firms. 
Table 6 presents the results of DID analyses of determinants of firms’ Tobin’s Q around 
 
9 In Model (2) of Table 5, we report the coefficient of only one time-varying CEO characteristic, CEO age, for the 
following reason. The patent value data provided by Kogan et al. (2017) end in 2010, resulting in the loss of all 
observations for which an executive serve as CEOs in two focal public firms. Therefore, the time invariant CEO 
characteristics, including gender and education degree, are thus not included in Model (2). Tenure is also not included 
in the regression because the tenure and age are perfect collinear. 
10 The 7.4 percent increase is calculated as follows. First, we obtain the annual patent value as the exponent of the 
coefficient Treatment*After in the regressions reported in Model (2) of Table 5 minus one. We then scale the annual 
patent value by the patent value of the sample firms in the year before the CEOs are hired. 
11 In unreported analysis, we find that patent enhancement effects are stronger in companies managed by CEOs who 
participated in private-to-private transactions (though the difference with respect to actions of CEOs who came from 
public-to-private PE targets is not statistically significant). Cohn and Towery (2013) document similar results for 




CEO successions. In addition to After and Treatment*After, we use a similar set of firm controls 
as those adopted by Cremers and Ferrell (2014). The interaction term Treatment*After is a 
significantly positive determinant of Tobin’s Q in both models, suggesting that CEOs with prior 
PE target experiences indeed create better firm value than CEOs without such experiences. The 
results are also economically significant: On average, public firm CEOs who previously held the 
CEO positions in PE targets increase Tobin’s Q by 6.6 percent within five years after taking the 
CEO positions compared to a matched sample of CEOs without such experiences.12,13 
3.4. Effects of prior PE target experiences on leverage 
We next examine the effects of CEOs’ prior PE target experiences on focal public firms’ financial 
policies, namely, leverage. In a typical PE buyout deal, PE firms acquire target firms with 60 to 
90 percent of debt and 10 to 40 percent of equity (Kaplan (1989), Kaplan and Strömberg (2009)). 
Despite its controversy, high leverage provides several benefits to PE buyout targets, including tax 
benefits, incentives for managers to work more efficiently, and the reduction of agency cost of 
equity (Jensen (1986)). We therefore investigate whether CEOs with prior PE target experiences 
follow the PE managing styles of increasing leverage.  
Table 7 reports the results of DID analyses. The dependent variables are the book leverage 
ratio (models (1) and (2)) and the market leverage ratio (models (3) and (4)). The book leverage 
ratio is the ratio of total book value of debt to total book value of assets. The market leverage is 
measured by the ratio of total book value of debt to the sum of total book value of debt and market 
capitalizations. We utilize a similar set of firm control variables to those adopted by Lemmon, 
 
12 The 6.6 percent increase is obtained by dividing the coefficient of Treatment*After in the regressions reported in 
Model (2) of Table 6 by the mean Tobin’s Q in the year before the CEOs are hired. 
13 Tobin’s Q improvement documented in Table 6 is not likely to be generated just by mechanical sales of value-losing 
assets. In unreported analysis, we find that CEOs with PE experience are less likely to divest underperforming 





Roberts, and Zender (2008). The coefficients of the interaction term Treatment*After remain 
positive and significant at the one percent level for book leverage and the five percent level for 
market leverage. Overall, these results suggest that CEOs with prior PE target experiences are 
associated with higher leverage, consistent with the potential spillover effects of PE managing 
styles on the financial policies of the CEOs’ current public firms. On average, the focal firm CEOs 
who used to be the CEO in the PE target increase book leverage (market leverage) by 13.3 (10.6) 
percent within five years after taking office compared to the control firms with CEOs without prior 
PE target experiences. 
3.5. Effects of prior PE target experiences: Cross-sectional analyses of potential channels 
The results presented in previous sections suggest that CEOs who previously worked in the PE 
buyout targets reduce capital expenditures, cut employment, boost patent values, enhance firm 
value, and increase leverage once they assume subsequent CEO positions in public firms. In this 
section, we focus on two of the most important initiatives PE firms implement on target firms – 
cost cutting and the development of valuable innovations – and further examine the mechanism of 
the effects of prior PE buyout target experiences on focal public firms’ capital expenditures and 
patent values. We do so by analyzing four possible channels:  (1) the reputation of PE firms with 
which the CEOs previously worked as CEOs in the PE targets, (2) the preference of PE firms (with 
which the CEOs previously assumed the CEO positions in the PE targets) to invest in targets with 
certain characteristics, (3) the recency of PE target experiences, and (4) the duration of the CEO’s 
PE target work experiences. In what follows, we discuss each of the channels in detail.  
3.5.1. Reputation of PE firms 
More reputable PE firms are more likely to accumulate more experiences and know-hows in 




targets who work with more reputable PE sponsors may thus interact with higher quality advisors 
and acquire better skills necessary for a successful firm turnaround. These CEOs may therefore 
exhibit a stronger managing style of private equity. Consequently, if the decline in capital spending 
and increase in patent values following the hiring of a new CEO (documented in Tables 3 and 5) 
are indeed related to PE managing styles, then we expect this behavior to be observed primarily in 
the subsample of public firm CEOs who previously held the same position in PE targets sponsored 
by more reputable PE advisors.   
 Following Demiroglu and James (2010), we measure the PE firm reputation based on the 
cumulative transaction values the PE firms invested within three years before investing in the PE 
target firms for which the CEO previously worked. We separate firms into two groups: firms whose 
CEOs served as CEOs in PE targets invested by more versus less reputable PE firms, based on the 
median split of this PE firm reputation measure. 
Panel A of Table 8 reports the results of DID analyses of capital expenditures and patent 
values for the subsamples of firms managed by CEOs who worked with more versus less reputable 
PE firms. Model 1 (2) of Panel A contains the same dependent and independent variables as Model 
2 in Tables 3 (5).14 For both capital expenditures and patent values, we find that the coefficients 
on the interaction term Treatment*After are significant only in the high PE firm reputation 
subsample (in addition, the coefficients Treatment*After in capital expenditures models for more 
vs. less reputable PE firm subsamples are statistically significantly different from each other). This 
result suggests that the PE management style effects documented for cost cutting (Table 3) and 
enhancing valuable innovations (Table 5) are primarily associated with CEOs who previously 
worked with reputable PE firms. Overall, our findings suggest that PE firm reputation, a measure 
 




of the intensity of the PE managing styles, indeed affects the investment policies and patent values 
of the focal public firms. 
3.5.2. Preferences of PE sponsors in investment targets 
If particular PE sponsors display a pattern of more substantial cost cutting and/or developing more 
valuable innovations, then the CEOs of PE targets working with such PE firms may be particularly 
influenced by these strong cost-cutting or innovations enhancing preferences. Such CEOs are then 
likely to develop their own intense management styles for capital expenditures or R&D activities 
in their subsequent jobs. If the decline in capital spending (the enhancement in valuable 
innovations) observed after a CEO with prior PE target experiences takes office is due to the 
managing styles of PE, we should expect the reduction in capital expenditures (the increase in 
patent values) to be more prevalent in the sample of CEOs who worked with PE sponsors that are 
more prone to adopting cost-cutting (enhancing R&D expenditures) strategies.  
Measuring a PE firm’s propensity to cut more capital expenditure of target firms or foster 
valuable innovations proves to be challenging. For cost cutting, we would ideally like to construct 
the PE firm preference measure based on the change in capital expenditures for all targets invested 
by the PE firm before it invests in the target for which the CEO previously worked. For innovation 
enhancement, the ideal measure of PE firm preferences is the level of R&D expenditures for all 
targets invested by the PE firm. However, the majority of the PE targets are private firms and thus 
their financial statement information is unavailable. Thus, we construct the PE firm preference 
measures based on the sample of going private transactions conducted by the PE firm before 
investing in the PE target for which the CEO in question worked. Using the sample of going private 
transactions allows us to observe capital or R&D spending from publicly disclosed statements 




unavailable for private firms, we also judge the expected propensity of PE sponsors based on the 
level, instead of change, of capital expenditures (scaled by total assets) right before the going 
private event. In case of capital spending, we assume that PE sponsors working with PE targets 
that have larger capital expenditures before going private are more likely to pursue cost cutting 
after the PE target goes private.15 In contrast, in the case of R&D expenditures, we expect PE 
sponsors that invest in PE targets with high level of ex-ante R&D expenditures will continue these 
high expenditures in order to generate superior value through innovation (documented by e.g. 
Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2011)) during the going private stage.16 
In order to construct the two PE firm preference measures, i.e., capital expenditures and 
innovations, we first obtain the mean capital expenditures (scaled by total assets) and R&D 
expenditures (scaled by sales) of all going-private transactions invested by the PE sponsor within 
ten years prior to its investment in each particular PE target for which our sample CEOs worked. 
Both measures are calculated based on the year before the target firms go private. We then rank 
the sample firms based on this PE firm preference measure and separate the sample into the high 
(low) capital expenditures and R&D cohorts, respectively, according to the median split. 
Panel B of Table 8 shows the results of DID analyses of capital expenditures and patent 
values for the subsamples of firms managed by CEOs who worked with PE firms investing in 
 
15 The assumption of the negative correlation between the ex-ante level of the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets 
(henceforth Capex/Assets) and the subsequent change in Capex/Assets during the private stage is supported by real-
world data. In untabulated analysis, we examine the sample of all PE targets from 1981 to 2017 that eventually exited 
via IPO and appear in Capital IQ database. In the subsample of targets with above median values of Capex/Assets in 
the year before going private, Capex/Assets significantly declined by 2.8 percentage points by the first year of the 
subsequent IPO. In contract, Capex/Assets stayed virtually unchanged in the subsample of PE targets with below-
median Capex/Assets values in the year before going private.  
16 The assumption of continued high R&D spending for PE targets with high R&D expenditures before going private 
is supported by real-world data. In untabulated analysis, we examine the sample of all PE targets from 1981 to 2017 
that eventually exited via IPO and appear in Capital IQ database. In the subsample of targets with above-median values 
of the ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales (henceforth R&D/Sales) in the year before going private, R&D/sales 
significantly increases by 2.2 percentage points in the first year following IPO. In contract, R&D/Sales stayed virtually 





targets with high versus low capital expenditures or R&D spending subsamples. The coefficients 
on the interaction term Treatment*After are statistically significant only in the high capital 
expenditure and high R&D subsamples (in addition, Treatment*After coefficients in capital 
expenditures models for high vs. low CapEx subsamples are statistically significantly different 
from each other). This result suggests that the previously identified CEO management styles that 
spur cost cutting and/or enhance innovations are primarily driven by CEOs who previously 
managed PE targets invested by PE firms that are likely to pursue decreases in capital spending or 
support innovative activities.  
3.5.3. The recency of PE target experiences 
If the relation between CEOs’ prior PE buyout target experiences and investment policies or patent 
values of the focal public firm is due to the managing styles these CEOs’ acquired from PE, then 
the strength of this relation should be affected by the time span between leaving the PE target and 
assuming the CEO position at the public company. The more recently the CEO worked in a PE 
target, the more likely he or she retains the managing practices and styles acquired while working 
for the PE target and applies them to the focal public firm. For example, the CEO may be 
influenced by more recent experiences as they can rely on a personal network of people the CEOs 
built while working for a recent PE target. Consequently, we expect the decline in capital spending 
and increase in patent values initiated by newly hired CEOs with PE target experiences to be 
stronger for CEOs who experienced relatively short time between leaving the PE target and being 
hired by the public firm as the new CEO.  
We measure the recency of a CEO’s PE target experiences based on the time span (in years) 
between the CEO’s leaving the PE targets and assuming the CEO positions in the focal public firm. 




work experiences, based on the median split of this time span. 
Panel C of Table 8 reports the results of DID analyses of capital expenditures and patent 
values for the subsamples of firms managed by CEOs with more versus less recent PE target 
experiences. The coefficients on the interaction term Treatment*After are statistically significant 
only in the subsample of CEOs with more recent PE target experiences (in addition, 
Treatment*After coefficients in capital expenditures models for more vs. less recent PE target 
experiences subsamples are statistically significantly different from each other). This suggests that 
the management styles aimed at the reduction of capital spending and support of innovation 
activities are primarily displayed by CEOs who were hired shortly after gaining their PE target 
experiences. Overall, the findings in Panel C provide further evidence that the cost cutting and 
innovation enhancement initiatives in the focal public firms are, at least in part, due to the PE 
managing styles CEOs acquired from previously working in PE buyout targets. 
3.5.4. The duration of PE target work experiences 
If the relation between CEOs’ prior PE buyout target experiences and the investment policies as 
well as patent values of focal public firms is driven by the managing styles these CEOs acquired 
from PE firms, then – similarly to the effect of the recency of CEOs’ PE target work experiences 
– we may expect this relation to be stronger if these CEOs spend a longer period of time in the PE 
target firms they previously worked for.  
We calculate the number of years the CEO worked for the PE targets and then separate 
focal public firms into two groups based on the median split of this length of PE target experiences. 
Panel D of Table 8 reports the results of DID analyses of capital expenditures and patent values 
for subsamples of firms managed by CEOs with longer versus shorter PE target experiences. The 




subsample of CEOs with longer PE target experiences. This suggests that the cost-cutting and 
innovation-promoting management styles are primarily exhibited by CEOs who spent longer time 
managing PE targets in the past. Overall, the findings in Panel D provide further evidence that 
suggests that the length of CEOs’ prior PE target experience matters for focal public firm’s 
investment policies and patent values, as longer time in the position of a PE target’s CEO likely 
allows the managers to better form their subsequent management styles. 
3.5.5. The buyout type 
In addition to the aforementioned cross-sectional channels, findings from the existing literature 
suggest that the effects of PE managing styles may vary by buyout types. For example, Davis, 
Haltiwanger, Handley, Lipsius, Lerner, and Miranda (2019) document that public targets cut more 
cost than private target after the buyout, while Cohn, Hotchkiss, and Towery (2020) and Fracassi, 
Previtero, and Sheen (2019) report than the value creation occur only for private targets. In 
unreported analyses, we split our sample based on the buyout type and find that cost-cutting are 
primarily implemented by CEOs who previously worked for public targets, and innovation 
enhancement is primarily adopted by CEOs who previously worked for private targets. The results 
suggest that cost cutting and innovation enhancing initiatives adopted by public firm CEOs may 
depend on the type of PE targets their previously worked on.  
3.5.6. PE experience and CEO personal traits 
The results in Table 8 suggest that the capital spending and innovation changes documented in this 
paper are primarily due to interactions of CEOs with more reputable PE firms and/or with PE 
advisors specializing in cost-cutting or innovation enhancement. In addition, we document that 
CEOs whose experiences with PE firms are more recent and/or longer tend to pursue more 




firms. Altogether, these findings suggest that the results documented in this study are primarily 
due to “on-job training” the CEOs gain while working in PE targets.  
At the same time, as finance literature has documented the effects of personal traits on firm 
policies and performance, in unreported analyses, we perform several robustness tests designed to 
examine the impact of potentially unobservable CEO personal attributes on their willingness to 
engage in corporate policies analyzed in this paper. We find little evidence that capital spending 
reductions and innovation enhancement are primarily pursued by CEOs who are pre-disposed to 
be “cost-cutters” or “innovators.” First, 26 out of the sample CEOs used to be in the public firm 
CEO position prior to joining PE targets (where they also hold the CEO position). However, we 
find that while in the pre-PE jobs, these CEOs were associated with capital spending increases and 
R&D reductions. It was only after working with PE firms when they – in their subsequent CEO 
jobs – got engaged in spending reductions and innovation enhancements. Second, 139 out of 209 
sample CEOs joined the PE targets after PE firms’ involvement. If the “cost-cutter” and “innovator” 
traits are relevant for successful CEOs, then these traits should be primarily present in this 
subgroup of CEOs (as PE firms are more likely to contribute to the selection of CEOs with these 
traits). However, we find that after hired as CEOs of public firms, there is no statistically 
significant difference in cost-cutting and innovation promoting between the CEOs who joined the 
PE target before vs. after the involvement of a PE firm. We also find no statistical significance 
between the two subsamples in terms of: time spent as the CEO of the PE target; CEO age, 
education, and gender; the likelihood of successful exit of the PE target via IPO or merger; and the 
underperformance of public firms that ultimately hire CEOs of PE targets. Most importantly, the 
impact of all four channels analyzed in Table 8 – reputation of PE firms, PE firm cost-cutting or 




statistically significant in the subsample of CEOs who joined the PE target after the PE firm. This 
finding implies that on-job training matters even for the CEOs who were likely approved or 
selected by PE firms before they joined the PE target.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper examines whether and how a CEO’s prior PE target work experiences help shape 
corporate policies and performance of the focal public firm he or she works for. Our findings reveal 
that CEOs of public firms who previously assumed the CEO position in the PE buyout targets 
display managing styles that are similar to those of PE. We first find that these CEOs implement 
strong cost cutting initiatives: They cut capital expenditures and employment within five years 
after they take office. We further show that these CEOs enhance patent values, result in higher 
Tobin’s, and increase leverage.  
As cost cutting and the pursuit of valuable innovations are two of the most important 
initiatives PE firms implement on target firms, we conduct four additional tests to analyze potential 
channels for the relation between CEOs’ prior PE target experiences and subsequent public firms’ 
investment policies and patent values. We find the effects to be stronger if the CEOs (1) worked 
in PE targets invested by more reputable PE sponsors, (2) worked in PE targets invested by PE 
sponsors that are more prone to cutting investment or investing in targets with higher R&Ds, (3) 
have more recent PE target work experiences, and (4) spent longer time managing the past PE 
targets. 
Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that PE has spillover effects on public 
firms through the experiences public firms’ CEOs acquired when they previously served as CEOs 




from complete. CEOs with prior PE buyout target experiences may bring other PE managing styles, 
such as fostering human capital, into the public firms. In addition, the existing literature suggests 
that the power of CEOs (see, e.g., Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005)) and/or the type of CEO 
turnovers (see, e.g., Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013)) matter for corporate policies and performance. 
Does the managing with PE style effects documented in this paper differ by the CEO power and/or 
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Table 1. Sample Distribution 
Table 1 describes the time distribution of the sample of CEOs who previously worked in private 
equity (PE) buyout target firms. Panel A reports the distribution of the year in which the CEOs are 
hired by the current firms. Panel B reports the distribution of the period (in years) between the 
CEOs leaving the PE buyout target firms and being hired by the current firms.  
Panel A: Distribution based on the year when the CEO starts to work in the current firm 
Year Frequency Percent 
1996 1 0.5% 
1997 4 1.9% 
1998 3 1.4% 
1999 2 1.0% 
2000 3 1.4% 
2001 5 2.4% 
2002 3 1.4% 
2003 1 0.5% 
2004 5 2.4% 
2005 14 6.7% 
2006 11 5.3% 
2007 13 6.2% 
2008 11 5.3% 
2009 11 5.3% 
2010 10 4.8% 
2011 13 6.2% 
2012 11 5.3% 
2013 15 7.2% 
2014 9 4.3% 
2015 12 5.7% 
2016 19 9.1% 
2017 20 9.6% 
2018 13 6.2% 







Table 1. Sample Distribution (Cont.) 
Panel B: Distribution based on the period (in years) between the CEOs leaving the PE buyout 
target firms and being hired by the current firms. 
Years Frequency Percent 
0 - 3 137 65.6% 
3 - 6 35 16.8% 
6 - 9 26 12.4% 
> 9 11 5.3% 






Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Table 2 reports the mean of public firm characteristics and CEO personal characteristics (based on 
the year before the CEOs are hired) for the treatment group and the control group, respectively. 
Column 4 provides the P-value of the differences in mean between treatment and the control group. 
P-value is calculated based on the t-test.  The numbers are calculated in the year before the CEOs 
are hired. The propensity score matching is based on a Probit regression of an indicator variable 
equal to one if the CEO has prior PE target work experiences on the firm characteristics including 
Log(Total assets), Leverage, ROA, Tobin’s Q, Tangibility, and Sales growth rate, as well as CEO 
characteristics including Age, and Graduate degree indicator. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to 
total assets. ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization 
(EBITDA) to total assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value of assets (total assets plus market 
capitalizations minus book value of equity) to book value of total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of 
property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to total assets. Sales growth rate is the percentage increase 
in total sales from the last year. Capex/Assets is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. 
Female is a dummy variable which equals one if a CEO is female. Graduate degree is a dummy 
variable which equals one if CEOs have graduate degrees. 
  Treatment Group  Control group  Differences 
Variables Mean  Mean  P-value 
Total assets 
(in millions) 3,422  3,643  0.845 
Total sales 
(in millions) 4,224  4,548  0.883 
Book leverage 0.544  0.558  0.648 
ROA 0.067  0.094  0.101 
Tobin's Q 1.806  1.802  0.982 
Tangibility 0.259  0.248  0.630 
Sales growth rate 0.061  0.025  0.334 
Capex/Assets 0.050  0.045  0.311 
Female 0.033  0.048  0.459 
CEO age 54.665  54.081  0.321 





Table 3. CEOs’ Prior PE Targets Experiences and Investment Policies 
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of focal public firms’ investment policies on CEOs’ 
prior PE target experiences. The dependent variable is capital expenditures to asset ratio. The 
sample construction is described in Table 2. We adopt the same control variables used by Baker, 
Stein, and Wurgler (2003) while adding variables that proxy for firm size, tangibility, and CEO 
characteristics. CF is the cash flow to assets ratio, where cash flow is defined as the sum of income 
before extradentary items and depreciation and amortization. KZ is the financial constraint index 
developed by Following Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), we adopt the four-variable version of 









+ 3.139𝐿𝐸𝑉  , where 
𝐶𝐹
𝐴
 is the cash flow  
over total assets, 
𝐷𝐼𝑉
𝐴
 is the cash dividend over total assets, 
𝐶
𝐴
 is the cash balance over total assets. 
Firm and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level are reported, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var. CapEx/Assets CapEx/Assets 
Treatment*After -0.007** -0.007** 
 (-2.13) (-2.14) 
After 0.005 0.005 
 (1.52) (1.56) 
Log (Sales) -0.007 -0.007 
 (-1.54) (-1.54) 
Tangibility 0.197*** 0.197*** 
 (4.53) (4.52) 
Tobin's Q 0.001 0.001 
 (0.98) (0.98) 
KZ*Q 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
 (3.12) (3.11) 
Cash flow -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.10) (-0.09) 
CEO age  -0.0004 
  (-1.02) 
Graduate degree  -0.002 
  (-0.94) 
CEO tenure  -0.0001 
  (-1.42) 
Female  -0.003 
  (-1.05) 
Constant 0.026 0.041 
 (1.28) (1.44) 
Adj. R2 0.687 0.687 




Table 4. CEOs’ Prior PE Targets Experiences and Employment Policies 
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of focal public firms’ employment policies on 
CEOs’ prior PE target experiences. The dependent variable is the number of employees (in 
thousands). The sample construction is described in Table 2. We control for firm characteristics in 
model 1, and we control for both firm characteristics and CEO personal characteristics in model 2. 
The firm characteristics includes Log (Sales), ROA, Tobin’s Q, Book Leverage, and R&D to Sales 
ratio. CEO personal characteristics include CEO age, Female, Graduate degree, and CEO tenure. 
Firm and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level are reported, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var. No. of Employees No. of Employees 
Treatment*After -1.241** -1.240** 
 (-2.11) (-2.10) 
After 0.423 0.465 
 (0.86) (0.94) 
Log (Sales) 4.206*** 4.180*** 
 (6.16) (6.13) 
ROA -7.453*** -7.416*** 
 (-4.49) (-4.47) 
Tobin's Q -0.328 -0.333 
 (-1.14) (-1.16) 
Book leverage -2.512** -2.499** 
 (-2.33) (-2.31) 
R&D/Sales 0.304 0.238 
 (0.08) (0.06) 
CEO age  0.009 
  (0.06) 
Female  -1.067 
  (-0.78) 
Graduate degree  -0.062 
  (-0.05) 
CEO tenure  -0.069 
  (-0.91) 
Constant -14.965*** -15.883** 
 (-4.32) (-2.44) 
Adj. R2 0.949 0.949 




Table 5. CEOs’ Prior PE Targets Experiences and Patent Value 
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of focal public firms’ innovation on CEOs’ prior 
PE target experiences. The dependent variable is the patent value, measured by the natural 
logarithm of 1 plus the average market value of the patents applied in a given year, where the 
market value of the patents is provided by Kogan et al. (2017). The sample construction process 
is described in Table 2. We control for firm characteristics in model 1, and we control for both 
firm characteristics and CEO personal characteristics in model 2. The firm characteristics includes 
Log (Sales), Tobin’s Q, Book Leverage, Tangibility, and ROA, and the CEO personal 
characteristics include CEO age. Firm and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported, and t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
 Patent value Patent value 
Treatment*After 0.314** 0.314** 
 (2.15) (2.15) 
After -0.225 -0.225 
 (-1.28) (-1.28) 
Log (Sales) 0.009 0.009 
 (0.18) (0.18) 
Tobin's Q 0.018 0.018 
 (0.75) (0.75) 
Book leverage 0.207 0.207 
 (1.10) (1.10) 
Tangibility 0.046 0.046 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
ROA -0.089 -0.089 
 (-0.50) (-0.50) 
CEO age  -0.042** 
  (-2.13) 
Constant 0.502** 2.177** 
 (2.17) (2.56) 
Adj. R2 0.729 0.729 




Table 6. CEOs’ Prior PE Targets Experiences and Firm Value 
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of focal public firm value on CEOs’ prior PE target 
experiences. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, measured as the ratio of market value of assets 
(total assets plus market capitalizations minus book value of equity) to book value of total assets.  
The sample construction process is described in Table 2. The firm control variables include 
Log(Sales),  Tangibility, ROA, Market Leverage measured by the ratio of total debt to the sum of 
total debt and market capitalization, and the natural log of market capitalization, and the CEO 
personal characteristics include CEO age, Female, Graduate degree, and CEO tenure. Firm and 
year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are reported, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var. Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Treatment*After 0.120** 0.119** 
 (2.20) (2.18) 
After -0.026 -0.014 
 (-0.60) (-0.31) 
Log (Sales) -0.431*** -0.434*** 
 (-6.68) (-6.73) 
Tangibility 0.406 0.410 
 (1.12) (1.13) 
ROA 1.333*** 1.333*** 
 (4.92) (4.92) 
Market leverage -1.003*** -1.005*** 
 (-4.51) (-4.52) 
Log (market cap.) 0.270*** 0.270*** 
 (5.18) (5.18) 
CEO age  -0.004 
  (-0.55) 
Female  0.025 
  (0.40) 
Graduate degree  -0.182** 
  (-2.39) 
CEO tenure  -0.005** 
  (-2.29) 
Constant 2.985*** 3.185*** 
 (8.98) (7.26) 
Adj. R2 0.759 0.759 




Table 7. CEOs’ Prior PE Targets Experiences and Leverage 
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of focal public firms’ leverage on CEOs’ prior PE 
target experiences. In models 1 and 2, The dependent variables are the book value of leverage ratio. 
In models 3 and 4, the dependent variables are the market leverage ratio. The book leverage is 
measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. The market leverage is measured by the ratio of 
total debt to the sum of total debt and market capitalizations. We control for firm characteristics in 
models 1 and 3, and we control for both firm characteristics and CEO personal characteristics in 
models 2 and 4. The firm characteristics include Log(Sales), Tobin’s Q, Tangibility, and ROA, and 
the CEO personal characteristics include CEO age, Female, Graduate degree, and CEO tenure.  
Firm and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level are reported, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. Book leverage Book leverage Market leverage Market leverage 
Treatment*After 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.041** 0.041** 
 (2.80) (2.79) (2.13) (2.12) 
After -0.011 -0.011 -0.004 -0.007 
 (-0.61) (-0.57) (-0.31) (-0.49) 
Log (Sales) 0.000 0.000 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (3.67) (3.66) 
Tobin's Q 0.002 0.002 -0.020** -0.020** 
 (0.52) (0.52) (-2.13) (-2.13) 
Tangibility 0.170 0.171 0.259*** 0.259*** 
 (0.90) (0.90) (2.78) (2.78) 
ROA -0.283*** -0.283*** -0.152*** -0.152*** 
 (-6.23) (-6.23) (-3.45) (-3.44) 
CEO age  0.000  0.001 
  (0.02)  (0.33) 
Female  0.010  -0.057** 
  (0.34)  (-2.04) 
Graduate degree  -0.059  -0.054 
  (-1.53)  (-1.49) 
CEO tenure  0.000  0.001 
  (0.24)  (0.71) 
Constant 0.270* 0.303 0.053 0.052 
 (1.83) (1.50) (0.73) (0.38) 
Adj. R2 0.636 0.636 0.743 0.743 




Table 8. Effects of CEOs’ Prior PE Targets Experiences: Channels 
This table compares investment and corporate innovation between two groups of firms based on 
the reputation of PE firms in Panel A, PE firm preferences in Panel B, recency of CEOs’ prior PE 
targets experiences in Panel C, and the length of CEOs’ prior PE targets experiences in Panel D. 
We measure the PE firm reputation based on the total transaction value the PE firms have invested 
within three years prior to investing in the PE target firm for which the CEO in question previously 
worked. We measure PE firm preference by taking the mean capital expenditure to asset ratio and 
R&D expenditure to sales ratio of all going private transactions invested by the PE firm within ten 
years before it invests in the PE target firm for which the CEO in question worked. The capital 
expenditure to asset ratio and R&D expenditure to sales ratio are measured based on the year 
before the target firm go private. We measure recency of CEOs’ prior PE targets experiences by 
calculating the period (in years) between the CEO’s leaving the PE targets and assuming the CEO 
positions in the focal public firms. We measure the length of CEOs’ prior PE targets experiences 
by calculating the number of years CEOs previously worked for the PE targets. We separate focal 
public firms into two groups based on a median split of these four measures. We report the 
differences in the coefficients of the interaction term Treatment*After between the two groups at 
the bottom of each Panel. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
reported, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 





















Table 8. Effects of CEOs’ Prior PE Targets Experiences: Channels (Cont.) 
Panel A. PE Firm Reputation  
Firms with CEOs working in targets invested by more reputable PE firms 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var. CapEx/Assets Patent value 
Treatment*After -0.013*** 0.324** 
 (-2.64) (2.15) 
After 0.009* -0.171 
 (1.77) (-0.86) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
CEO Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
N 1689 683 
Firms with CEOs working in targets invested by less reputable PE firms 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var. CapEx/Assets Patent value 
Treatment*After -0.000 0.314 
 (-0.03) (1.57) 
After 0.001 -0.293 
 (0.24) (-1.41) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
CEO Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
N 1704 598 
Differences in coefficient Treatment*After 
Coefficients -0.013** 0.010 







Table 8. Effects of CEOs’ Prior PE Targets Experiences: Channels (Cont.) 
Panel B. PE Firm Preferences 
High CapEx or R&D cohort 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var. CapEx/Assets Patent value 
Treatment*After -0.012** 0.646** 
 (-2.28) (2.09) 
After 0.006 -0.378 
 (0.87) (-1.10) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
CEO Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
N 1003 359 
Low CapEx or R&D cohort 
  (15) (16) 
Dep. Var. CapEx/Assets Patent value 
Treatment*After 0.003 0.233 
 (0.39) (1.43) 
After 0.003 -0.064 
 (0.50) (-0.29) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
CEO Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
N 987 414 
Differences in coefficient Treatment*After 
Coefficients -0.015* 0.412 








Table 8. Effects of CEOs’ Prior PE Targets Experiences: Channels (Cont.) 
Panel C. The Recency of CEOs’ Prior PE Targets Experiences 
Firms whose CEOs have more recent PE target experiences 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var. CapEx/Assets Patent value 
Treatment*After -0.013*** 0.439** 
 (-2.61) (2.61) 
After 0.010** -0.160 
 (2.21) (-0.83) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
CEO Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
N 1727 657 
Firms whose CEOs have less recent PE target experiences 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var. CapEx/Assets Patent value 
Treatment*After 0.001 0.209 
 (0.19) (1.16) 
After -0.002 -0.322 
 (-0.47) (-1.50) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
CEO Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
N 1666 624 
Differences in coefficient Treatment*After 
Coefficients -0.014** 0.230 






Table 8. Effects of CEOs’ Prior PE Targets Experiences: Channels (Cont.) 
Panel D. The length of CEOs’ Prior PE Targets Experiences 
Firms with CEOs having longer PE target experiences 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var. CapEx/Assets Patent value 
Treatment*After -0.011** 0.360** 
 (-2.06) (2.15) 
After 0.006 -0.277 
 (1.33) (-1.41) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
CEO Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
N 1723 653 
Firms with CEOs having shorter PE target experiences 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var. CapEx/Assets Patent value 
Treatment*After -0.003 0.268 
 (-0.64) (1.52) 
After 0.003 -0.175 
 (0.66) (-0.88) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
CEO Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
N 1670 628 
Differences in coefficient Treatment*After 
Coefficients -0.008 0.092 












Existing literature extensively studies the importance of managerial ability. For example, 
managerial ability relates to firm performance (Demerjian, Lev, and Mcvay (2012)), earnings 
quality (Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and Mcvay (2013)), credit risk assessment (Bonsall, Holzman, 
and Miller (2017)), corporate tax avoidance (Koester, Shevlin, and Wangerin (2017)), shareholder 
tax sensitivity of dividends(Guan, Li, and Ma (2018)), and earnings forecast accuracy (Baik, 
Farber, and Lee (2011)). However, it is far less clear whether and how managerial ability 
propagates through economic links. This paper aims to answer this question by examining whether 
the managerial ability of customer firms affects the managerial ability, efficiency, and additional 
policies of the supplier firms. To the best of our knowledge, the present research is the first to 
study the managerial ability spillover effects from the perspective of the supply chain. 
Since the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), who define a firm as a nexus of a 
set of contracting relationships among stakeholders, the issue of whether and how a firm’s 
relationship with its stakeholders affects its policies and outcomes has received considerable 
academic attention. Recently, a growing literature examines the effects of the customer-supplier 
relationship.17 The evidence suggests that customer firms significantly influence supplier firms’ 
accounting policies, financial policies, innovative output, product market outcomes, and even 
corporate social responsibilities.  
 There are several reasons why customers’ managerial ability might propagate through 
supply chains. First, accounting literature suggests that the relationship with customers fosters 
 
17 For example, customers exert influence on suppliers’ corporate social responsibilities (Dai, Liang, and Ng (2020),  
tax strategies (Cen, Maydew, Zhang, and Zuo (2017)), corporate innovations(Chu, Tian, and Wang (2019); 
Dasgupta, Zhang, and Zhu (2015)), profitability(Irvine, Park, and Yıldızhan (2016)), cost of equity capital 
(Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh (2016)), accounting conservatism(Hui, Klasa, and Yeung (2012)), disclosure 
(Ellis, Fee, and Thomas (2012)), forecast (Jochem and Peters (2019)), and capital structure decisions (Kale and 




information sharing along the supply chain and helps supplier firms streamline production and 
enhance working capital management (e.g., Kinney and Wempe (2002); Patatoukas (2012); Irvine, 
Park, and Yıldızhan (2016)). Thus, suppliers’ managerial ability may improve during the process. 
In addition, since customers are typically bigger and thus have more bargain power, it is likely that 
the customer takes action to push the supplier to adopt good accounting and corporate policies. 
Therefore, the supplier managerial ability might improve involuntary during the process. Finally, 
the industrial organization literature documents that the economical link in the supply chain is 
often characterized by relationship-specific investment and repeated interactions. Therefore, the 
close relationship between the customer and supplier requires a high level of coordination, which 
enhances efficiency, tax avoidance, and operational effectiveness (Cannon and Homburg (2001); 
Vickery, Jayaram, Droge, and Calantone (2003); Cen et al. (2017); Chu, Tian, and Wang (2019)). 
If the customer has better managerial abilities, supplier managers may find the policies adopted by 
the customers beneficial and apply them to their own firms with the help of repeated interactions 
with their customers in their daily operations.   
 We measure the managerial ability according to Demerjian, Lev, and Mcvay (2012), who 
define managerial ability as manager’s efficiency, relative to their industry peers, in transforming 
corporate resources to revenues. Demerjian, Lev, and Mcvay (2012) examine the efficiency of 
firms’ abilities to turn the mix of resources into firms’ revenues and assess managerial ability as 
the component of this efficiency that is unexplained by firms’ characteristics (that is, more able 
managers are able to turn the same mix of resources into greater revenues). Demerjian, Lev, and 
Mcvay (2012) provide evidence that managerial ability is indeed related to personal, rather than 




To mitigate the concerns that customers with more able managers might prefer and thus select a 
certain type of suppliers (such as suppliers also with more able managers), we take the following 
steps: First, we use the customer CEO succession as a quasi-natural experiment for supplier 
managerial ability and policy changes. Specifically, we include only the sample of external CEO 
turnovers in the customer firms, because the ability of externally hired CEOs (measured in their 
prior firms) is less likely to contain the current customers’ characteristics, and therefore the results 
may be less subject to endogeneity issue. Second, we then adopt a difference-in-difference (DID) 
design that relies on whether the managerial ability of the customer firm changes after the 
incumbent customer CEO is replaced by another CEO outside the firm (with better vs. worse 
managerial ability compared to the incumbent). The goal of the DID strategy aims to mitigate the 
concern of endogenous matching between customers and suppliers. In the DID setting, we further 
control for customer-supplier pair fixed effects and year fixed effects to control for the time-
invariant unobservable characteristics for each customer-supplier pair and unobservable temporal 
shocks.18  
 Utilizing the sample of 132 customer CEO turnovers from 1990 through 2017, we 
document a positive spillover effect of managerial ability from the customer firms on their 
suppliers. We find that both the managerial ability and total efficiency (defined as the ability to 
generate sales from a given set of inputs) of suppliers improve when their customers externally 
hire more able CEOs. These effects are economically significant. Specifically, the percentile rank 
of supplier’s managerial ability increases by 12 from the median, and the percentile rank of 
 
18 In unreported analyses, we also include (1) supplier firm fixed effects and year fixed effects, (2) supplier firm fixed 
effects and supplier industry-year fixed effects, and (3) supplier firm fixed effects and customer industry-year fixed 
effects in the DID analyses to control for various types of unobservable factors that may drive the main findings. 




supplier’s total efficiency increases by 10 from the median over the next three years after the more 
able CEOs take office in the customer firms.19,20 
 To examine the underlying mechanisms of the managerial ability spillover effects, we 
conduct seven cross-sectional tests, detailed as follows. 
 First, we document that suppliers that are more financially constrained are associated with 
more improvements in managerial ability and firm efficiency than their less financially constrained 
counterparts after more able customer CEOs are hired. Firms that are financially constrained may 
have greater needs to streamline their businesses and operate more efficiently. These firms may 
thus be more motivated to learn from their customers. 
Second, suppliers who are more vertically related to their customer industry are associated 
with higher managerial ability and firm efficiency after more able customer CEOs take office. 
Firm boundaries are smaller when the two industries are more vertically related. Therefore, the 
supplier managers may pay more attention to what happened in their customer industry and have 
better incentives to learn from their more able customer managers. 
 Third, suppliers who share more similar technology space with their customers exhibit 
higher managerial ability and firm efficiency after more able customer CEOs take office. Literature 
documents that technology spillovers are stronger when two industries share similar technology 
space (e.g. Jaffe (1986); Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013); Qiu and Wan (2015)). 
 
19 The improvements in supplier managerial ability and total efficiency are likely not due to higher intensity of the 
supplier-customer relationship after the more able CEO takes over the customer firm. In fact, in unreported analysis, 
we find supplier managerial ability and total efficiency changes are very similar across three groups: suppliers who 
significantly increase their sales to their customers (above one standard deviation) after the customer CEO succession, 
suppliers who significantly decrease their sales to the customers (below one standard deviation), and suppliers whose 
sales to their customers do not change much (within one standard deviation). 
20 In unreported analysis, we find insignificant differences in managerial ability changes (associated with customer 
CEO successions) between the samples of suppliers that change vs. retain their CEOs following managerial succession 




Therefore, supplier firm managers might be more able to learn from the customer managers 
possessing skills that can be easily transferred to their own firms. 
 Fourth, managerial ability spillover effects are stronger when customer CEOs are hired 
within the same industry. Incoming CEOs hired from within the same industry possess industry-
specific knowledge and skills that can be easily transferred to any firm within the same industry 
(Castanias and Helfat (2001)). Therefore, supplier managers may learn better from their customer 
managers who already accumulate more successful experiences in the same industry. 
  Fifth, suppliers who are more important to their customers increase managerial ability and 
improve efficiency compared to less important suppliers. We measure supplier importance by 
dividing the supplier's sales to a certain customer by the customers’ cost of goods sold (COGS) 
(Intintoli, Serfling, and Shaikh (2017)). If customers and suppliers are mutually important to each 
other, the communications and coordination between their CEOs might be more frequent, and thus 
the managerial ability spillover effects may be stronger. 
 Sixth, suppliers who have longer relationships with their customers are associated with 
better managerial ability and total efficiency improvement than those with shorter relationships 
with their customers. Customer and supplier firms working together for longer periods of time 
might be associated with more relationship-specific investments (Intintoli, Serfling, and Shaikh 
(2017)), and therefore more frequent communication between the CEOs.21 The supply firms’ 
managerial ability may thus improve more in such situations.  
 Finally, supplier firms whose top managers were previously socially connected with 
customer managers are associated with higher managerial ability and better total firm efficiency. 
Our results are supported by a vast literature that the presence of social, educational, and 
 
21 For example, customer may need to have regular visit to the suppliers to train suppliers to meet their quality 




professional connections among directors and top managers of US firms facilitate information 
diffusion and affect a firm’s corporate policy decisions (e.g., Fracassi (2017); Dasgupta, Zhang, 
and Zhu (2015)). The existence of past social links among top managers of supplier and customer 
firms may facilitate easier communication between the new customer CEO and the supplier CEO 
– leading to improved supplier managerial ability as a result. 
 We next examine the spillover effects of customer’s managerial ability on the policies and 
performance of supplier firms. We find that after customer firms hire more able CEOs, the supplier 
firms improve earnings quality and earnings persistence (as defined by e.g., Dechow, Ge, and 
Schrand (2010); Demerjian et al. (2013)). According to the existing literature, more able managers 
are more knowledgeable of their business, leading to better judgment and estimates of earnings, 
thus delivering higher earnings quality (Demerjian et al. (2013)).  
Next, we show that following the customer CEO turnovers in which more able external 
CEOs are hired, supplier firms receive better credit ratings. Debt holders may value more able 
managers, as they can add value to the debt market by producing more stable future performance 
and by reducing the likelihood that the companies miss the principal and interest payments 
(Bonsall, Holzman, and Miller (2017)). In addition, we find that supplier firms increase leverage 
after the CEO turnover of customer firms who externally hire more able CEOs, possibly because 
more able supplier managers may be capable of operating with higher leverage levels without 
causing financial distress to their firms. 
Finally, we document that the supplier firms’ performance, as proxied by Tobin’s Q, 
improves after their customers externally hire more able CEOs. This is consistent with previous 
findings that more able managers can generate higher revenue from a given level of resources and 




 While our main analysis focuses on customer CEO turnovers in order to examine the causal 
nature of managerial ability spillovers, in robustness tests we find that the managerial ability 
spillover effects hold for the full panel of all possible customer-supplier pair year observations 
from 1990 to 2017. Our results suggest that the supplier’s managerial ability in year t+1 is 
positively associated with the customer’s managerial ability in year t. Collectively, our findings 
support the “managerial ability spillover” effects through supply chains. 
 Our study is related to multiple strands of accounting and finance literature. First, our work 
is related to the literature on the importance of managerial ability. The existing literature shows 
that managerial ability has positive effects on the firm performance (Demerjian, Lev, and Mcvay 
(2012)), earnings quality (Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and Mcvay (2013)), credit risk assessment 
(Bonsall, Holzman, and Miller (2017)), corporate tax avoidance (Koester, Shevlin, and Wangerin 
(2017)), shareholder tax sensitivity of dividends(Guan, Li, and Ma (2018)), and earnings forecast 
accuracy (Baik, Farber, and Lee (2011)).  Our study is the first to show that other than the effects 
of managerial ability on their own firms, the managerial ability might spill over to other 
stakeholders. Second, our paper builds on literature that examines the effects of customers on firm 
policies, such as suppliers’ corporate social responsibilities (Dai, Liang, and Ng (2020),  tax 
strategies (Cen, Maydew, Zhang, and Zuo (2017)), corporate innovations(Chu, Tian, and Wang 
(2019); Dasgupta, Zhang, and Zhu (2015)), profitability(Irvine, Park, and Yıldızhan (2016)), cost 
of equity capital (Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh (2016)), accounting conservatism(Hui, 
Klasa, and Yeung (2012)), disclosure (Ellis, Fee, and Thomas (2012)), forecast (Jochem and Peters 





 The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data and sample description. 
Section 3 discusses the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.   
 
2. Data and sample description 
This section describes the data source and presents the main summary statistics. 
2.1. Data 
We identify customer-supplier pair data from Compustat Industry Segment file during the period 
from 1990 through 2017. According to SFAS No. 131, firms are required to disclose the identity 
of their principal customers that accounts for more than 10% of total sales, and some firms 
voluntarily report the identity of customers below the threshold. On average, the sales from a 
supplier to a customer account for 18 percent of the supplier’s total sales, while the sales from a 
supplier to a customer only account for 2 percent of the customer’s cost of goods sold (COGS). 
Thus the suppliers in our sample are the customers’ dependent suppliers. 
We utilize the Boardex database to identify all CEOs in the US public firms during the sample 
period. We focus on the subsample of  CEOs who are hired directly from another company instead 
of being promoted internally following Demerjian, Lev, and Mcvay (2012), as the managerial 
ability measure of externally hired incoming CEOs (measured in their prior firms) are likely to 
contain the customers’ internal firm characteristics, and therefore the results are less likely to 
subject to endogeneity issue.22 Data on managerial ability and firm efficiency are extracted from 
the Web page of Peter Demerjian (https://peterdemerjian.weebly.com/managerialability.html ). 
 
22 We do not require that the incoming CEOs assume the CEOs positions in their prior companies, as we expect the 
managerial ability measure represents the managerial ability of the top management team. In addition to CEOs, they 




We obtain firm accounting information from Compustat and the stock price information 
from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The analyst coverage data are extracted from 
the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (IBES). The institutional ownership data are obtained 
from Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings. The vertical integration scores are provided 
by the Hoberg-Phillips Data Library. The patent data are obtained from Noah Stoffman’s website 
(https://kelley.iu.edu/nstoffma/). 
The sample excludes financial firms (SIC Codes 6000 – 6999) and utility firms (SIC Codes 
4900 – 4999), as well as customer-supplier pairs that do not survive within one year after the 
customer CEO takes office. Our final sample consists of 132 customer CEO turnovers, 447 
customer-supplier pairs, and 2,297 customer-supplier pair year observations. 
2.2. Dependent variables 
2.2.1. Managerial ability and firm efficiency 
Managerial ability is an unobservable variable. Prior research use proxies for managerial ability 
based on managers’ median citations, past performance, or manager fixed effects (e.g., Fee and 
Hadlock (2003); Milbourn (2003); Francis, Huang, Rajgopal, and Zang (2008)). However, most 
of these measures are difficult to attribute solely to the managers versus the firms (Francis et al. 
(2008)).23  
Our main measures of managerial ability (MA Score) and total firm efficiency (EF Score) 
are derived by Demerjian, Lev, and Mcvay (2012). They implement a two-step procedure to 
quantify managerial ability (MA Score). In the first step, they compute the total efficiency (EF 
Score) of a firm relative to its industry peers based on a data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach. 
DEA is a nonparametric method widely used in operation research and economics to evaluate the 
 
23 The managerial fixed effect is an exception. However, this measure relies on those managers who switch firms (e.g., 




relative efficiency of separable entities. DEA efficiency is measured by the ratio of outputs over 
inputs.  Specifically, Demerjian et al. (2012) consider one output and seven inputs, where output 
measure is revenue and inputs variables include Cost of Inventory (COGS); Selling, General, and 
Administrative Expenses (SG&A); Net Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE); Net Operating 
Leases (OpsLease); Net R&D (NetR&D); Purchased Goodwill (Goodwill); and Other Intangible 
Assets (OtherIntan). The DEA procedure solves the following optimization problem at the 
industry year level by varying the weights (ν). This maximization uses all the firms in a certain 
industry year and determines the weights that maximize Equation (1a) for each firm relative to 




𝜃𝑡 = (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡) ∙  (𝑣1𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡 + 𝑣2𝑆𝐺&𝐴𝑡 + 𝑣3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 + 𝑣4𝑂𝑝𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝑣5𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑅&𝐷𝑡 +
𝑣6𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 + 𝑣7𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡)
−1                              (1a) 
The derived optimal weights are then plugged back into the right side of Equation (1a), 
resulting in a ratio based efficient score for each firm. Efficient firms are those that can generate 
more revenues from a given set of inputs. All efficiency scores are then scaled by the highest 
efficiency scores in the industry year, yielding an ordinal sorting of firms on relative efficiency, 
EF Score. EF Score ranges from 0 to 1, where the most efficient firms have the value of one, 
indicating optimal efficiency.  
Since corporate managers and corporate internal resources serve as inputs and jointly 
contribute to the outputs, in the second step,  Demerjian, Lev, and Mcvay (2012) partition total 
firm efficiency into two components: firm-specific efficiency and managerial ability. They do so 
by regressing total efficiency on a set of firm characteristics, including firm size, market share, 




components of the efficiency, i.e., the residuals in the regressions, is regarded as the component of 
efficiency driven by manger-specific factors (i.e., managerial ability) as shown in Equation (1b): 
𝜃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛽1 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4 𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡) +𝛽5𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                 (1b) 
The second step is critical in that it ensures that managerial ability is distinct from firm 
characteristics. The study argues that more able managers understand the technology and industry 
trends better, predict product demand more accurately, invest in higher-value projects, and manage 
their employees more efficiently than less able managers (Demerjian, Lev, and Mcvay (2012)). 
Therefore, more able managers can run firms more efficiently. 
Demerjian, Lev, and Mcvay (2012) validate the MA score as a proxy for managerial ability 
through the following analyses. First, the measure is strongly associated with manager fixed effects 
rather than firm fixed effects. Second, the stock price reactions to the chief executive officer (CEO) 
turnovers are positive when the outgoing CEO has a low ability. Third, replacing the CEOs with 
more able CEOs is associated with improvement in subsequent firm performance. The evidence 
collectively suggests that the MA score largely captures the managerial differences rather than 
firm-specific effects. 
2.2.2. Earnings quality measures 
We adopt two measures of earnings quality documented by Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010). 
Specifically, we select (i) the extent to which accruals reflect cash flows (Dechow and Dichev 
(2002)) and (ii) persistence of earnings (Sloan (1996); Hui, Nelson, and Yeung (2016)) because 
we expect the supplier managers can learn how to estimate accruals more accurately and measure 




2.2.3. Credit ratings and other dependent variables 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Lafond (2006); Alissa, Bonsall, 
Koharki, and Penn (2013); Bonsall, Holzman, and Miller (2017)), we use S&P issuer-level credit 
ratings as a proxy for the credit risk. We convert the letter credit ratings to a numerical scale from 
1 to 22, where higher numbers correspond to more favorable ratings, following Bonsall, Holzman, 
and Miller (2017).24  
Finally, we use market leverage as a proxy for the capital structure of the firm and use 
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm performance. 
2.3. Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the customers and suppliers. The statistics suggest that the 
supplier has a significantly lower managerial ability than their customers (as evidenced by lower 
MA scores). The suppliers are also run less efficiently than their customers (as documented by 
lower EF scores). In addition, the suppliers are smaller, younger, less profitable, pay fewer 
dividends, but are more innovative, and have higher growth opportunities than their customers. 
The differences in these characteristics between customers and suppliers are statistically 
significant at the one percent level. 
 
3. Research design and empirical results 
To test how the managerial ability of the customers spills over to their suppliers, we analyze the 
following difference-in-difference (DID) framework: 
 




𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡+1 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝐴 𝐼𝑚𝑝 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 +
 𝛽3𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑡 + 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 − 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 𝑡+1                 (2) 
 Supplier Dependent Variable is the outcome variable of the supplier measured in year t + 
1, including managerial ability, firm efficiency, credit ratings, accrual quality, leverage, and 
Tobin’s Q. The estimation window starts from three years before to three years after the customer 
CEO takes office. 
 All independent variables are measured in year t. We report the definition of these variables 
in Appendix A. Our main explanatory variable of interest is the interaction term Post*MA Imp 
Dummy. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the time of the observation is 
within three years after a customer CEO takes office and zero otherwise. MA Imp Dummy is a 
dummy variable that measures whether the incoming customer CEO is more able than the outgoing 
CEO (that is, whether the MA score improved after the managerial succession). Specifically, we 
compare the outgoing CEOs’ average managerial ability score over the last three years before the 
turnover with that of the incoming CEOs over the same periods (measured in their prior firms). In 
all the analyses, we include both customer-supplier pair fixed effects and year fixed effects to 
control for potential time-invariant unobservable customer-supplier pair level characteristics as 
well as time trends that might bias our results. Finally, we cluster the standard errors at the 
customer-supplier pair level to account for time-series correlations within the pairs. 
3.1. Effects of the customers’ managerial ability on the suppliers’ managerial ability and firm 
efficiency 
Table 2 reports the DID results that examine whether the managerial ability of the suppliers is 




variables include Post*MA Imp Dummy, Post, as well as customer-supplier fixed effects and year 
fixed effects, but we do not control for firm characteristics. In model (2), we control for only 
customer characteristics, which include Log (Sales), R&D, Mkt Lev, Tobin's Q, and Log (Firm 
Age). In model (3), in addition to the same control variables as adopted by Demerjian, Lev, and 
Mcvay (2012), we control for additional supplier characteristics, including ROA, Sales Growth, 
Tobin’s Q, PPE, market leverage (Mkt Lev), and dividend payer indicator (Div Payer). In model 
(4), we control for both customer and supplier characteristics. In all the four models, the 
coefficients of the interaction term Post*MA Imp Dummy are significant, suggesting that the 
supplier’s managerial ability increases after more able customer CEOs take office. The findings 
thus provide the first piece of evidence regarding the managerial ability spillover effects through 
supply chains. The results are not only statistically significant but also economically significant: 
the percentile rank of supplier’s managerial ability increases by 12 from the median over the next 
three years after the more able customer CEOs take office.25 
 Next, we investigate whether the customers’ managerial ability has a significant impact on 
the suppliers’ total efficiency. We report the DID analysis results in Table 3. The dependent 
variable is the supplier’s total firm efficiency (EF Score). In this table, we adopt the same model 
form as in Table 2. Our findings suggest that the suppliers’ total efficiency increases after their 
customers replace outgoing CEOs with more able incoming CEOs, as the coefficients of the 
interaction term Post*MA Imp Dummy are significant across all the four models. These results 
further support the hypothesis that supplier managers can learn from the more able customer 
managers and improve their firm efficiency. Moreover, the effects are not only statistically 
 
25 The median of the dependent MA Score is -0.017, which represents the 50th percentile. -0.017 plus 0.026 (the 
coefficient of Post*MA Imp Dummy in Model 4 of Table 2) represents the 62nd percentile. The percentile rank 




significant but also economically significant: the percentile rank of suppliers’ total efficiency 
increases by 10 from the median over the next three years after the more able customer CEOs take 
office.26 
 In unreported analysis, we re-run the regressions reported in Table 2 and Table 3 separately 
for the subsamples of suppliers whose sales increased vs. did not increase after the new customer 
CEO took over. This is done to test for the possibility that the improvements in supplier managerial 
ability and total efficiency may be due to higher intensity of the supplier-customer relationship 
after the more able CEO takes over the customer firm. We do not find support for this effect. In 
fact, supplier managerial ability and total efficiency changes are very similar across three groups: 
suppliers who significantly increase their sales to their customers (above one standard deviation) 
after the customer CEO succession, suppliers who significantly decrease their sales to the 
customers (below one standard deviation), and suppliers whose sales to their customers do not 
change much (within one standard deviation). Also in unreported analysis, we re-run the 
regressions reported in Table 2 and Table 3 for the subsample of forced customer CEO turnovers. 
The results are very similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 3. Last, in unreported analysis, we 
analyze the potential managerial ability spillover following customer CEO successions separately 
for the subsamples of suppliers that change vs. retain their CEOs following managerial succession 
at their customers. We find no statistically significant difference between the effects of improved 
customer CEO managerial ability – as measured by the coefficient for Post*MA Imp Dummy – 
between the two subsamples. 
 
 
26 The median of the dependent MA EF is 0.28, which represents the 50th percentile. 0.28 plus 0.029 (the coefficient 
of Post*MA Imp Dummy in Model 4 of Table 3) represents the 60th percentile. The percentile rank increase by 10 is 




3.2. Managerial ability spillover effects: cross-sectional analyses 
The results presented in the previous section suggest that suppliers’ managerial ability and total 
efficiency improve after their dependent customers replace their incumbent CEOs with more able 
outside CEOs. To further examine the mechanism of the effects of customers’ managerial ability 
on suppliers’ managerial ability and firm efficiency, we conduct the following cross-sectional tests: 
(1) the financial constraints of the suppliers, (2) supplier-customer vertical relatedness, (3) 
supplier-customer innovation correlation, (4) customer CEO intra-industry succession, (5) the 
importance of the supplier for a given customer, (6) the duration of the customer-supplier 
relationship, and (7) the social network connections between the suppliers and customers. In what 
follows, we discuss each of the channels in detail. 
3.2.1. Financial constraints of the suppliers 
Supplier firms that are financially constrained may have greater needs to streamline their 
businesses and run the firm efficiently, and therefore the managers are more motivated to learn 
from their more able customer managers. Consequently, we expect that the suppliers who are more 
financially constrained are associated with better improvements in managerial ability and firm 
efficiency after more able customer CEOs take office.  
 Following Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), we measure the financial conditions of the 
dependent variables based on the average KZ-index of suppliers within three years prior to the 
customer CEO turnover. We separate firms into two groups: suppliers who are more versus less 
financially constrained, based on the median split of this financial constraint measure. 
 Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of DID analyses of supplier managerial ability and 
total firm efficiency for the subsamples of suppliers who are more versus less financially 




Model 4 in Tables 2 (3). For both MA Score and FE Score, we find that the coefficients on the 
interaction term Post*MA Imp Dummy are significant only in the more financially constrained 
supplier subsample. In addition, the coefficients Post*MA Imp Dummy in both of the two models 
for more vs. less financially constrained supplier subsamples are statistically significantly different 
from each other. This result suggests that the managerial ability spillover effects are primarily 
associated with suppliers who are more financially constrained. Overall, our findings suggest that 
the financial health of the suppliers indeed affects the extent to which the suppliers learn from their 
more able customer managers. 
3.2.2. Supplier-customer vertical relatedness 
When the customer industry and supplier industry are more vertically related, the boundaries 
between firms in the two industries are smaller, and therefore the skills supplier managers learned 
from their more able customer managers might be more transferable to their own firms. In addition, 
when two industries are more vertically related, the products are more likely to flow from one 
industry to another, therefore the supplier managers may have a better understanding of what 
happens in their customer industry and may find it easier to learn from their more able customer 
mangers.  
 We measure the vertical relatedness between the customer industry and supplier industry 
based on the median of text-based vertical integration scores of all the firm pairs in the customer 
and supplier industries over the three years before the CEO successions of the customers, where 
the construction process of vertical integration scores is documented in Phillips, Hoberg, Frésard, 
and Cornelli (2020), and data are provided by the Hoberg-Phillips Data Library. We separate firms 
into two groups: suppliers who are in the industry that is more versus less vertically related to the 




Panel B of Table 4 reports the results of DID analyses of supplier managerial ability and 
total firm efficiency for the subsamples of suppliers who are in the industry more versus less 
vertically related to the customer industry. The coefficients on the interaction term Post*MA Imp 
Dummy are significant only in the subsample of suppliers who are in the industry more vertically 
related to the customer industry. In addition, the coefficients Post*MA Imp Dummy between the 
more versus less vertically related groups are statistically significantly different from each other. 
The results indicate that the managerial ability spillover effects are primarily driven by suppliers 
in industries more vertically related to the customer industries. 
3.2.3. Supplier-customer innovation correlation 
Technology innovations are crucial for firms to sustain their competitive advantage and 
productivity growth. Many studies support the existence of technology spillovers across firms, and 
that the technology spillovers are stronger when the two industries similar technology space (e.g. 
Jaffe (1986); Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013); Qiu and Wan (2015)). Therefore, the 
supplier managers are more able to learn from the customer managers who possess skills that can 
be easily transferred to their own firms.  
 We measure the technology space similarity between the customer industry and supplier 
industry based on the uncentered correlation of their share of patents across 426 United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) following Jaffe (1986) over the three years before the 
customer CEO turnover. We separate firms into two groups: suppliers who are in the industry that 
shares higher versus less innovation correlation with their customer industry, based on the median 
split of this measure. 
 Panel C of Table 4 reports the results of DID analyses of supplier managerial ability and 




less correlated with customer industry technology space. The coefficients on the interaction term 
Post*MA Imp Dummy are significant only in the subsample of suppliers who are in the industry 
that shares more similar technology space with their customer industry. In addition, the coefficients 
Post*MA Imp Dummy in both of the two models for the subsample of suppliers who are in the 
industry that shares higher vs. lower innovation correlation with their customer industry are 
statistically significantly different from each other. Overall, the results in Panel C suggest that the 
managerial ability spillover effects are primarily associated with suppliers whose industry shares 
a higher innovation correlation with the customer industry. 
3.2.4. Customer intra-industry CEO succession 
Incoming CEOs hired from within the same industry possess industry-specific knowledge and 
skills that can be easily transferred to any firm within the same industry (Castanias and Helfat 
(2001)). In addition, the incoming CEOs need less “learning time” on the new job if they are hired 
within the same industry than if they are hired from a different industry. Therefore, supplier 
managers may learn better from their customer managers who have already accumulated more 
successful experiences in the same industry. We therefore expect that managerial ability spillover 
effects are stronger if the more able customer CEOs are hired from within the same industry. 
 We separate our sample into two groups based on whether CEOs are hired within the same 
Fama French 48 industry. About 49% of customer CEOs are hired within the same industry. 
 Panel D of Table 4 reports the results of DID analyses of supplier managerial ability and 
total firm efficiency for the subsamples of suppliers whose customer CEOs are hired within the 
same industry versus from a different industry. The coefficients on the interaction term Post*MA 
Imp Dummy are significant only in the subsample of suppliers whose customer CEOs are hired 




effects are primarily associated with suppliers whose customer CEOs are hired from within the 
same industry.  
3.2.5. Importance of the supplier for a given customer  
If the managerial ability of the customers can spill over to the suppliers, then the spillover effects 
should be stronger if the customers and their suppliers are mutually important to each other. If 
customers and suppliers are both very important to each other, the communications and 
coordination between them will be more frequent, and thus the managerial ability spillover effects 
will be stronger.  
As the customers in our sample account for a great proportion of sales of their suppliers, 
they are very important to the suppliers. Hence, we still need to define the importance of the 
suppliers to their customers. Following Intintoli, Serfling, and Shaikh (2017), we measure the 
importance of a supplier by the proportion of the customer’s cost of goods sold (COGS) that is 
accounted for by the supplier, i.e., (sales from the supplier)/(COGS of its customer). The intuition 
is that a supplier is very important to a customer if a high proportion of the customer’s COGS are 
accounted for by the supplier. We then separate firms into two groups: suppliers that are more or 
less important to the customers, based on the median split of this measure. 
Panel E of Table 4 reports the results of DID analyses of supplier managerial ability and 
total firm efficiency for the subsamples of suppliers who are more or less important for their 
customers. The coefficients on the interaction term Post*MA Imp Dummy are significant only in 
the subsample of suppliers who are more important for their customers. Overall, the findings in 
Panel E provide further evidence that the managerial ability of customers can spill over to their 





3.2.6. Duration of the customer-supplier relationship 
If the improvement in supplier managerial ability and total efficiency is driven by the improvement 
in the customer managerial ability, then we may expect this relation to be stronger if a certain 
customer-supplier pair have known each other for a longer period of time. Firms that have known 
each other for longer periods of time are associated with more relationship-specific investments 
(Intintoli, Serfling, and Shaikh (2017)), and therefore their CEOs may meet more regularly and 
have more effective communications.  
 We calculate the number of years from the year when a supplier first reports positive sales 
to a particular customer to the year of the customer CEO succession and then separate the focal 
public firms into two groups based on the median split of this length of the relationship. Panel F 
of Table 4 reports the results of DID analyses of supplier managerial ability and total firm 
efficiency for the subsamples of suppliers who have a longer or shorter relationship with their 
customers. The coefficients on the interaction term Post*MA Imp Dummy are significant only in 
the subsample of suppliers who have longer relationships with their customers. This suggests that 
improvements in managerial ability and total firm efficiency are primarily exhibited by suppliers 
who have longer relationships with their customers. Overall, the results in Panel F provide further 
evidence that the managerial ability and total efficiency improvement of the suppliers are due to 
the improvement of the managerial ability of their long-standing customers. 
3.2.7. Social network connections between the supplier managers and the customer managers 
A vast literature in sociology shows that the presence of social, educational, and professional 
connections among directors and top managers of U.S. firms facilitate information diffusion and 
affect a firm’s corporate policy decisions (e.g., Fracassi (2017); Dasgupta, Zhang, and Zhu (2015)). 




companies may facilitate communication between the new customer CEO and the supplier CEO. 
We therefore expect that suppliers whose managers previously share social network connections 
with customers’ managers are associated with higher managerial ability and run firms more 
efficiently after more able customer CEOs take office.  
We utilize Boardex database to identify interpersonal links among supplier and customer 
managers in our sample and define a supplier and a customer as connected if top managers (CEO, 
president, and other CXOs) of the suppliers and customers managers participated in the same 
organization at the same time in the past. For example, two managers are “connected” if they both 
worked at the same firms, went to the same university, or were members of social clubs during the 
same periods in the past. We then split the sample based on whether such a connection exists.  
Panel G of Table 4 reports the results of DID analyses of supplier managerial ability and 
total efficiency for the subsamples of suppliers whose managers were previously connected versus 
not connected with customer managers. The coefficients on the interaction term Post*MA Imp 
Dummy are significant only in the subsample of suppliers whose managers previously were 
connected with customer managers. This suggests that improvements in managerial ability and 
total efficiency are primarily exhibited by suppliers who share social network connections with 
their customers.  
3.3. Effects of the customer’s managerial ability on the supplier’s earnings quality 
To provide further support for the managerial ability spillover effects, we examine whether the 
supplier’s earnings quality improves after the higher ability customer CEO takes office. Demerjian 
et al. (2013) document that more able managers are more knowledgeable of their business, which 




managerial ability truly spills over to their dependent suppliers, we should expect that the 
supplier’s earnings quality improves after the more able customer CEO takes office. 
We adopt two measures of earnings quality: the map of accruals into cash flows (Accrual 
Quality) and persistence of earnings.  
3.3.1. Accrual quality 
Our measure of accrual quality follows Dechow and Dichev (2002), who argue that high-quality 
accruals can be realized as cash flow, while incorrectly estimated accruals are less likely to be 
realized as cash flows. We expect that a supplier manager is less likely to have erroneous accruals 
if his/her managerial ability improves. Specifically, we estimate the firm’s ability to map the 
accruals to cash flows by estimating the following regression by Fama French 48 industry and year. 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂 𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂 𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂 𝑡+1 + 𝛽4∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸 𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑡−1 +  𝜀 𝑡                (3) 
Following Hribar and Collins (2002), we measure accruals (ACCR) by income before 
extraordinary items plus extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus cash flow from 
operations scaled by beginning total assets. We measure cash flows (CFO) by cash flow from 
operations scaled by beginning total asset. The residuals from Equation (3) measure the extent to 
which current accrual maps into the past, current, or future cash flows. The smaller residuals 
indicate high-quality mapping. We control for the current year change in sales (∆Sales), the current 
year property, plant, and equipment (PPE), and the inverse of total assets at the beginning of the 




Following prior research (e.g., Demerjian et al. (2013)), we measure accrual quality by 
taking the standard deviation of a rolling four-year window and multiply this measure by -1 so that 
a higher value of the measure indicates higher accrual quality.27 
 The DID results of accrual quality are reported in Table 5. The dependent variable is 
Accrual Quality. Similar to Table 2, we do not include firm control variables in the model (1), 
include only customer control variables in the model (2), include only supplier control variables 
in the model (3), and include both customer control variables and supplier control variables in the 
model (4). We control for the same set of customer characteristics in Table 5 as in Table 2. Our 
supplier control variables follow Demerjian et al. (2013). The coefficients of Post*MA Imp Dummy 
are significant at the five percent level across all the four models. The results indicate that the 
supplier’s earnings quality is positively correlated with the improved customer’s managerial ability 
following the customer CEO turnover.  
3.3.2. Earnings persistence 
Our second measure of earnings quality is earnings persistence. If the supplier manager’s ability 
improves, the manager will choose better projects, have a better understanding of risk, and 
therefore the supplier will have more persistent earnings (Demerjian et al. (2013)). Specifically, 
we estimate the following model. 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑡+1 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝐴 𝐼𝑚𝑝 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑡 ∗
𝑀𝐴 𝐼𝑚𝑝 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑡 + 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 − 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +  𝜀 𝑡+1       (4) 
The dependent variable is the earnings in the year t+1, and the key independent variable of 
interest is the three-way interaction term Earningst* Post* MA Imp Dummy, where Earnings is 
 
27 In untabulated analyses, our results are similar if we measure accrual quality based on residuals calculated following 




measured by the ratio of operating income after depreciation to the average total assets (our 
measure of ROA) following the earnings quality literature (e.g., Sloan (1996); Hui, Nelson, and 
Yeung (2016)). 
The DID results of earnings persistence are reported in Table 6. The coefficients of 
Earnings* Post* MA Imp Dummy are positive and significant across all four models. The results 
thus provide further evidence that the improved customer’s managerial ability has positive impacts 
on the supplier’s earnings quality.  
3.4. Effects of the customer’s managerial ability on the supplier’s credit ratings 
Firms with more able managers are associated with more favorable credit ratings because debt 
holders are likely to value more able managers, as they can add debt value by producing more 
stable future performance and by reducing the likelihood that the companies miss the principal and 
interest payments (Bonsall, Holzman, and Miller (2017)). We therefore expect that the suppliers 
will have more favorable credit ratings after their customers appoint CEOs with improved 
managerial ability. 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Lafond (2006); Alissa, 
Bonsall, Koharki, and Penn (2013); Bonsall, Holzman, and Miller (2017)), we use S&P issuer 
level credit ratings as a proxy for the credit risk. Following Bonsall, Holzman, and Miller (2017),  
we convert the S&P issuer level letter ratings to a numerical scale from 1 to 22, where higher 
numbers correspond to more favorable ratings (see Appendix B for detailed description). 
The DID results of credit ratings are reported in Table 7. The dependent variable is the 
supplier’s credit ratings. We adopt the same set of customer controls as previous tables. Our 
supplier control variables follow Bonsall, Holzman, and Miller (2017). In addition, we control for 




Age). The coefficients of Post* MA Imp Dummy are positive and significant at the one percent 
level across all the four models. The results indicate that the suppliers’ credit ratings are positively 
correlated with improved customer’s managerial ability. The results are not only statistically 
significant but also economically significant: the coefficients of Post* MA Imp Dummy are around 
1, which represent one letter increase in supplier’s credit ratings (for example, from A to A+). on 
average, over the next three years after the more able customer CEO takes office. 
3.5. Effects of the customer’s managerial ability on the supplier’s leverage 
If more able managers understand the technology and industry trends better, predict product 
demand more accurately, invest in higher-value projects, and manage their employees more 
efficiently (Demerjian, Lev, and Mcvay (2012)), which then translate into higher quality earnings, 
higher credit ratings, and lower cost of debt, than the less able managers, then we should expect 
the more able supplier managers can bring more tax benefits to the company by increasing the 
leverage. 
Table 7 reports the results of DID analyses. The dependent variable is the firm’s market 
leverage, measured by the ratio of total debt (the sum of long-term and short-term debt minus cash) 
to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. We adopt the same set of customer controls 
as those in the previous tables while our supplier control variables are based primarily on Lemmon, 
Roberts, and Zender (2008). The coefficients of Post* MA Imp Dummy are positive and significant 
across all the models. The results suggest that the improved managerial ability of newly-appointed 




3.6. Effects of the customer’s managerial ability on the supplier’s performance 
So far, we have established that customer’s managerial ability has positive effects on the supplier's 
managerial ability, total efficiency, earnings quality, credit ratings, and leverage. In this section, 
we examine whether these effects indeed create firm value – proxied by Tobin’s Q. 
Table 9 presents the results of DID analyses of determinants of supplier’s Tobin’s Q around 
customer CEO successions. We adopt the same set of customer controls as previous tables and use 
a set of supplier control variables primarily based on Cremers and Ferrell (2014). The coefficients 
of Post* MA Imp Dummy are positive and significant across all the four models, suggesting that 
improved customer’s managerial ability after CEO succession has a positive association with their 
suppliers’ firm performance. 
3.7. Robustness tests 
Our paper focuses on customer CEO turnovers in order to examine the causal nature of managerial 
ability spillovers. To test whether the positive relationship between improved customer managerial 
ability and subsequent increase in supplier managerial ability holds even in the complete panel 
settings, we perform the following analysis for the full panel of customer-supplier pair year 
observations from 1990 to 2017:  
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡+1 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑀𝐴 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡 +
 𝛽2𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑡 + 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 − 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 𝑡+1                        (5) 
Specifically, the dependent variable is the managerial ability of the suppliers in the year 
t+1. The key independent variable of interest is Positive MA Change, a dummy variable equal to 




The panel regression results are reported in Table 10. The coefficients of Positive MA 
Change are significant at the one percent level across all the four models. The results suggest that 
the supplier's managerial ability is positively associated with the customer’s managerial ability 
improvement. Collectively, our findings suggest that the managerial ability spillover effects hold 
for the full sample of customer-supplier pairs. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Previous accounting and finance literature has linked improved managerial ability to e.g. better 
firm performance, earnings quality, and earnings forecast accuracy. This paper is the first to 
document that improved customers’ managerial ability can spill over into their suppliers. Our 
findings reveal that after CEO successions in customer firms, the improved managerial ability of 
the new customer CEO is positively correlated with better subsequent managerial ability and total 
efficiency of the supplier. 
To further examine the mechanism of the effects of the customer’s managerial ability on 
dependent supplier managerial ability and their total efficiency, we find the effects are stronger if 
(1) the supplier is financially constrained, (2) the supplier is in the industry that is more vertically 
related with its customer industry, (3) the supplier is in the industry that shares similar technology 
space with its customer industry, (4) the customer CEOs are hired from within the same industry, 
(5) the supplier is more important to its customer in term of the proportion of the customer’s cost 
of goods sold (COGS) accounted for by the supplier, (6) the customer-supplier relationship lasts 





We further find that the supplier’s earnings quality, credit ratings, leverage, and firm 
performance are positively correlated with the customer’s managerial ability.  
Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that customer’s managerial ability has a 
spillover effect on their dependent suppliers. Nevertheless, the pictures of the managerial ability 
spillover effects are far from complete. For example, does managerial ability have spillover effects 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
This table reports the number of customer-supplier pair observations and summary statistics of managerial ability scores (MA scores), 
firm efficiency score (EF score), firm-level characteristics. The variables are reported for both suppliers and customers. Firm 
characteristics include Total Assets, Total Sales, return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, market leverage (Mkt Lev), Sales Growth, PPE, 
R&D, dividend payer indicator (Div Payer), and Firm Age. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  Variables associated with Suppliers   Variables associated with Customers 
Variable No. Obs. Mean Median SD 25th 75th  No. Obs. Mean Median SD 25th 75th 
MA Score 2,297 0.03 -0.02 0.16 -0.06 0.06  2,297 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.01 0.30 
EF Score 2,297 0.34 0.28 0.19 0.23 0.38  2,297 0.66 0.69 0.25 0.44 0.89 
Total Assets 
(in Millions) 
2,297 2,386 329 8,400 78 1,525 2,297 46,239 22,059 65,769 5,540 60,058 
Total Sales 
(in Millions) 
2,297 2,171 314 5,733 76 1,341 
 
2,297 43,186 30,715 42,702 7,872 69,018 
ROA 2,297 0.03 0.07 0.23 -0.01 0.13  2,297 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.11 
Tobin's Q 2,297 1.94 1.27 3.13 0.84 2.11  2,297 1.18 0.95 1.01 0.67 1.33 
Mkt Lev 2,297 0.20 0.11 0.23 0.00 0.30  2,297 0.32 0.23 0.27 0.12 0.45 
Sales Growth 2,297 0.09 0.07 0.31 -0.04 0.22  2,297 0.05 0.04 0.19 -0.03 0.12 
PPE 2,297 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.07 0.29  2,297 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.09 0.31 
R&D 2,297 0.08 0.04 0.14 0.00 0.11  2,297 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05 
Div Payer 2,297 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00  2,297 0.58 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 




Table 2. The Customer’s Managerial Ability and the Supplier’s Managerial Ability 
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of the dependent supplier’s managerial ability on 
the customer’s managerial ability. The dependent variable is the supplier’s managerial ability score 
(MA Score). The key independent variable is the interaction term Post* MA Imp Dummy. In model 
one, we do not control for firm characteristics. In model two, we control for only customer 
characteristics. In model three, we control for only supplier characteristics. In model four, we 
control for both customer and supplier characteristics. Year fixed effects and supplier-customer 
pair fixed effects are included in all regressions. The customer characteristics include Log (Sale), 
R&D, Mkt Lev, Tobin's Q, and Log (Firm Age). The supplier characteristics include Firm Size, 
ROA, Sales Growth, Log (Firm Age), Tobin’s Q, PPE, Mkt Lev, Div Payer, Business Segment 
Concentration, Positive Free Cash Flow, and Market Share. All the variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the customer-supplier pair 
level are reported, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. F. MA Score F. MA Score F. MA Score F. MA Score 
Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.027** 0.026** 0.026** 0.026** 
 (2.40) (2.47) (2.47) (2.57) 
Post 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 
 (0.34) (0.45) (0.47) (0.58) 
Cus Log(Sale)  -0.009  -0.005 
  (-0.70)  (-0.37) 
Cus R&D  0.144  0.086 
  (0.58)  (0.36) 
Cus.  Mkt. Lev.  -0.007  -0.008 
  (-0.89)  (-1.09) 
Cus Tobin's Q  -0.001  -0.004 
  (-0.14)  (-0.84) 
Cus Firm Age  -0.021  -0.017 
  (-0.54)  (-0.49) 
Sup Firm Size   -0.038*** -0.038*** 
   (-4.75) (-4.81) 
Sup ROA   0.019 0.019 
   (0.86) (0.88) 
Sup Sales Growth   0.020* 0.020* 
   (1.80) (1.80) 
Sup Firm Age   -0.005 -0.003 
   (-0.26) (-0.13) 
Sup Tobin's Q   -0.000 0.000 
   (-0.01) (0.02) 
Sup PPE   -0.031 -0.036 




Table 2. The Customer’s Managerial Ability and the Supplier’s Managerial Ability (Cont.) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. F. MA Score F. MA Score F. MA Score F. MA Score 
Sup Mkt Lev.   0.000 0.000 
   (0.54) (0.51) 
Sup Div. Payer   0.017** 0.017** 
   (2.02) (2.01) 
Sup Business Segment 
Concentration   -0.021 -0.022 
    (-1.19) (-1.26) 
Sup Positive Free Cash Flow   0.000 0.000 
   (0.07) (0.07) 
Sup Market Share   1.416* 1.443* 
   (1.66) (1.69) 
Constant 0.017*** 0.176 0.259*** 0.360** 
 (3.92) (1.03) (3.45) (2.04) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.695 0.694 0.701 0.701 






Table 3. The Customer’s Managerial Ability and the Supplier’s Total Efficiency 
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of the dependent supplier’s total firm efficiency 
on the customer’s managerial ability. The dependent variable is the supplier’s total efficiency score 
(EF Score). The key independent variable is the interaction term Post* MA Imp Dummy. In model 
one, we do not control for firm characteristics. In model two, we control for only customer 
characteristics. In model three, we control for only supplier characteristics. In model four, we 
control for both customer and supplier characteristics. Year fixed effects and supplier-customer 
pair fixed effects are included in all regressions. The customer characteristics include Log (Sale), 
R&D, Mkt Lev, Tobin's Q, and Log (Firm Age). The supplier characteristics include Firm Size, 
ROA, Sales Growth, Log (Firm Age), Tobin’s Q, PPE, Mkt Lev, Div Payer, Business Segment 
Concentration, Positive Free Cash Flow, and Market Share. All the variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the customer-supplier pair 
level are reported, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. F. EF Score F. EF Score F. EF Score F. EF Score 
Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.029** 0.029** 0.028** 0.029** 
 (2.45) (2.52) (2.47) (2.57) 
Post 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 
 (0.74) (0.78) (0.83) (0.89) 
Cus Log(Sale)  -0.004  -0.004 
  (-0.26)  (-0.28) 
Cus R&D  0.125  0.088 
  (0.47)  (0.34) 
Cus.  Mkt. Lev.  -0.007  -0.006 
  (-0.77)  (-0.78) 
Cus Tobin's Q  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.24)  (-0.31) 
Cus Firm Age  -0.028  -0.023 
  (-0.58)  (-0.51) 
Sup Firm Size   -0.022** -0.022** 
   (-2.51) (-2.51) 
Sup ROA   0.047** 0.048** 
   (2.28) (2.27) 
Sup Sales Growth   0.020* 0.020* 
   (1.87) (1.86) 
Sup Firm Age   -0.023 -0.019 
   (-0.99) (-0.82) 
Sup Tobin's Q   0.001 0.001 
   (0.98) (1.02) 
Sup PPE   -0.007 -0.011 




Table 3. The Customer’s Managerial Ability and the Supplier’s Total Efficiency (Cont.) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. F. EF Score F. EF Score F. EF Score F. EF Score 
Sup Mkt Lev.   0.000 0.000 
   (0.31) (0.26) 
Sup Div. Payer   0.013 0.014 
   (1.52) (1.53) 
Sup Business Segment 
Concentration   0.004 0.002 
   (0.21) (0.13) 
Sup Positive Free Cash Flow   -0.004 -0.004 
   (-0.69) (-0.68) 
Sup Market Share   1.817** 1.827** 
   (2.21) (2.24) 
Constant 0.333*** 0.460** 0.502*** 0.610*** 
 (73.39) (2.34) (5.92) (2.86) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.751 0.750 0.754 0.753 






Table 4. Cross-sectional Analyses 
This table compares managerial ability and firm efficiency between two groups of suppliers based 
on the financial conditions of the suppliers in Panel A, the degree of vertical relatedness between 
the customer industry and the supplier industry in Panel B, the innovation correlation between the 
customer industry and the supplier industry in Panel C, whether customer CEOs are hired within 
the same Fama French 48 industry in Panel D, the importance of the suppliers to their customers 
in Panel E, the length of the relationship between the suppliers and their customers in Panel F, and 
the social network connections between the suppliers and their customers in Panel G. We measure 
the financial conditions of the suppliers by taking the mean of KZ index over three years before 
the CEO successions of the customers, KZ is the financial constraint index developed by Baker, 










+ 3.139𝐿𝐸𝑉 , where 
𝐶𝐹
𝐴
 is the cash flow over total assets, 
𝐷𝐼𝑉
𝐴
 is the cash 
dividend over total assets, 
𝐶
𝐴
 is the cash balance over total assets. We measure the vertical 
relatedness between the customer industry and supplier industry based on the median of text-based 
vertical integration scores of all the firm pairs in the customer and supplier industries over the three 
years before the CEO successions of the customers, where the construction process of vertical 
integration scores is documented in Phillips, Hoberg, Frésard, and Cornelli (2020), and data are 
provided by the Hoberg-Phillips Data Library. We measure the innovation correlation between the 
customer industry and the supplier industry based on the uncentered correlation of their share of 
patents across 426 United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) following Jaffe (1986) 
over the three years before the CEO successions of the customers. We measure the importance of 
the suppliers by taking the mean of the ratio of the sales from the suppliers to customers to the cost 
of goods sold (COGS) of the customers over three years before the CEO successions of the 
customers. We measure the length of the relationship between customers and suppliers based on 
the number of years from the year when a supplier first reports positive sales to a particular 
customer to the year of the customer CEO succession. We measure the social network connections 
between customers and suppliers based on whether the top managers (CEO, president, and other 
CXOs) of the suppliers have social network connections with the customer managers before the 
year of the CEO succession in the customers. We separate focal suppliers into two groups based 
on a median split of the financial conditions of the suppliers, the degree of vertical integration 
between the customer industry and the supplier industry, the innovation correlation between the 
customer industry and supplier industry, the importance of the suppliers to their customers, and 
the length of the relationship between the suppliers and their customers in Panel A, B, C, E, and F 
respectively, and based on whether customer CEOs are hired within the same industry and whether 
supplier top managers share social network connections with customer managers in Panel D and 
G respectively. We report the differences in the coefficients of the interaction term Post * MA Imp 
Dummy between the two groups at the bottom of each Panel. Year fixed effects and supplier-
customer pair fixed effects are included in all regressions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered at the customer-supplier pair level are reported, and t-statistics are reported in 




Table 4. Cross-sectional Analysis (Cont.) 
Panel A. The Financial Conditions of Suppliers 
Suppliers who are more financially constrained 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var.  F. MA Score  F. EF Score 
Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.047*** 0.047*** 
 (3.17) (2.95) 
Post -0.001 0.002 
 (-0.09) (0.15) 
Customer Controls Yes Yes 
Supplier Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,120 1,120 
Suppliers who are less financially constrained 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var.  F. MA Score  F. EF Score 
Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.006 0.010 
 (0.47) (0.67) 
Post 0.005 0.006 
 (0.43) (0.49) 
Customer Controls Yes Yes 
Supplier Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,112 1,112 
Differences in coefficient Post* MA Imp Dummy 
Coefficients 0.040** 0.037* 




Table 4. Cross-sectional Analysis (Cont.) 
Panel B. Vertical Relatedness 
Suppliers whose industry is more vertically related to the customer industry 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var.  F. MA Score  F. EF Score 
Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.048*** 0.049*** 
 (4.37) (4.10) 
Post 0.009 0.015 
 (0.90) (1.41) 
Customer Controls Yes Yes 
Supplier Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,036 1,036 
Suppliers whose industry is less vertically related to the customer industry 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var.  F. MA Score  F. EF Score 
Post* MA Imp Dummy -0.011 -0.010 
 (-0.58) (-0.47) 
Post 0.007 0.011 
 (0.38) (0.62) 
Customer Controls Yes Yes 
Supplier Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,010 1,010 
Differences in coefficient Post* MA Imp Dummy 
Coefficients 0.059*** 0.059** 




Table 4. Cross-sectional Analysis (Cont.) 
Panel C. Innovation Correlation Between the Customer Industry and the Supplier 
Industry 
Suppliers whose industry shares higher innovation correlation with the customer industry 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var.  F. MA Score  F. EF Score 
Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.036** 0.039** 
 (2.29) (2.31) 
Post 0.000 0.000 
 (0.03) (0.02) 
Customer Controls Yes Yes 
Supplier Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes 
Observations 961 961 
Suppliers whose industry share higher innovation correlation with the customer industry 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var.  F. MA Score  F. EF Score 
Post* MA Imp Dummy -0.006 -0.002 
 (-0.57) (-0.17) 
Post 0.027* 0.032** 
 (1.97) (2.20) 
Customer Controls Yes Yes 
Supplier Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes 
Observations 961 961 
Differences in coefficient Post* MA Imp Dummy 
Coefficients 0.038* 0.037* 




Table 4. Cross-sectional Analysis (Cont.) 
Panel D. Whether the Customer CEOs are Hired Within the Same Industry 
Customer CEOs who are hired within the same industry 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var.  F. MA Score  F. EF Score 
Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.048** 0.052** 
 (2.37) (2.24) 
Post 0.004 0.007 
 (0.21) (0.36) 
Customer Controls Yes Yes 
Supplier Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes 
Observations 769 769 
Customer CEOs who are hired from a different industry 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var.  F. MA Score  F. EF Score 
Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.006 0.009 
 (0.51) (0.66) 
Post 0.005 0.008 
 (0.46) (0.69) 
Customer Controls Yes Yes 
Supplier Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,528 1,528 
Differences in coefficient Post* MA Imp Dummy 
Coefficients 0.042* 0.043 




Table 4. Cross-sectional Analysis (Cont.) 
Panel E. The Importance of the Suppliers to the Customers 
Suppliers who are more important to the customers 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var.  F. MA Score  F. EF Score 
Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.037** 0.042*** 
 (2.57) (2.65) 
Post -0.001 0.003 
 (-0.12) (0.24) 
Customer Controls Yes Yes 
Supplier Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,147 1,147 
Suppliers who are less important to the customers 
  (1) (2) 
   F. MA Score  F. EF Score 
Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.016 0.017 
 (1.12) (1.12) 
Post 0.008 0.009 
 (0.54) (0.55) 
Customer Controls Yes Yes 
Supplier Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,149 1,149 
Differences in coefficient Post* MA Imp Dummy 
Coefficients 0.021 0.025 




Table 4. Cross-sectional Analysis (Cont.) 
Panel F. The Length of the Relationship Between Customers and Suppliers 
Suppliers who have a longer relationship with customers 
  (1) (2) 
   F. MA Score  F. EF Score 
Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.029** 0.038*** 
 (2.18) (2.64) 
Post 0.020** 0.022** 
 (2.05) (2.16) 
Customer Controls Yes Yes 
Supplier Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,139 1,139 
Suppliers who have a shorter relationship with customers 
  (1) (2) 
   F. MA Score  F. EF Score 
Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.019 0.016 
 (1.25) (0.95) 
Post 0.001 0.005 
 (0.06) (0.32) 
Customer Controls Yes Yes 
Supplier Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,158 1,158 
Differences in coefficient Post* MA Imp Dummy 
Coefficients 0.010 0.022 




Table 4. Cross-sectional Analysis (Cont.) 
Panel G. The Social Network Connections Between Customers and Suppliers 
Suppliers whose top managers are socially connected with customers’ managers 
  (1) (2) 
   F. MA Score  F. EF Score 
Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.036* 0.036* 
 (1.95) (1.81) 
Post 0.006 0.009 
 (0.36) (0.55) 
Customer Controls Yes Yes 
Supplier Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes 
Observations 917 917 
Suppliers whose top managers are not socially connected with customers’ managers 
  (1) (2) 
   F. MA Score  F. EF Score 
Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.005 0.009 
 (0.48) (0.76) 
Post 0.012 0.015 
 (1.20) (1.41) 
Customer Controls Yes Yes 
Supplier Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,300 1,300 
Differences in coefficient Post* MA Imp Dummy 
Coefficients 0.031 0.027 




Table 5. The Customer’s Managerial Ability and the Supplier’s Accrual Quality 
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of the supplier’s accrual quality on the customer 
managerial ability. The dependent variable is the supplier’s accrual quality. The key independent 
variable is the interaction term Post* MA Imp Dummy. In model one, we do not control for firm 
characteristics. In model two, we control for only customer characteristics. In model three, we 
control for only supplier characteristics. In model four, we control for both customer and supplier 
characteristics. Year fixed effects and supplier-customer pair fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. The customer characteristics include Log (Sale), R&D, Mkt Lev, Tobin's Q, and Log 
(Firm Age). The supplier characteristics include Firm Size, ROA, Tobin's Q, PPE, BHAR, Div 
Payer, ∆Sales Growth, %Loss, Sales Vol, Cash Flow Vol, and Log (Firm Age). All the variables 
are defined in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the customer-
supplier pair level are reported, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 










Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.026** 0.025** 0.026** 0.025** 
 (2.26) (2.23) (2.26) (2.21) 
Post -0.018** -0.016** -0.019*** -0.018*** 
 (-2.39) (-2.17) (-2.85) (-2.81) 
Cus Log (Sale)  -0.003  -0.008 
  (-0.16)  (-0.47) 
Cus R&D  -0.108  -0.124 
  (-0.39)  (-0.45) 
Cus Mkt Lev  0.010  0.007 
  (1.12)  (0.86) 
Cus Tobin's Q  -0.009  -0.006 
  (-0.98)  (-0.75) 
Cus Log (Firm Age)  0.078  0.081 
  (1.39)  (1.61) 
Sup Firm Size   0.028** 0.028** 
   (1.99) (2.03) 
Sup ROA   -0.082 -0.082 
   (-1.40) (-1.43) 
Sup Tobin's Q   -0.011* -0.011* 
   (-1.83) (-1.85) 
Sup PPE   0.019 0.024 
   (0.22) (0.28) 
Sup BHAR   0.008** 0.008** 
   (2.25) (2.20) 
Sup Div Payer   0.021* 0.021 




Table 5. The Customer’s Managerial Ability and the Supplier’s Accrual Quality (Cont.) 










Sup ∆Sales Growth   -0.002 -0.002 
   (-0.24) (-0.24) 
Sup %Loss   -0.023 -0.025 
   (-0.87) (-0.95) 
Sup Sales Vol   -0.026 -0.020 
   (-0.90) (-0.71) 
Sup Cash Flow Vol   0.079 0.069 
   (0.58) (0.50) 
Sup Operating Cycle   -0.001 -0.004 
   (-0.07) (-0.23) 
Sup Log (Firm Age)   0.029 0.015 
   (0.87) (0.43) 
Constant -0.132*** -0.349 -0.362*** -0.517* 
 (-46.58) (-1.28) (-2.61) (-1.87) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.722 0.723 0.755 0.756 





Table 6. The Customer’s Managerial Ability and the Supplier’s Earnings Persistence 
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of the dependent supplier’s accrual quality on the 
customer’s managerial ability. The dependent variable is the supplier’s earnings. The key 
independent variable is the three-way interaction term Earnings* Post* MA Imp Dummy, where 
Earnings is measured by the ratio of operating income after depreciation to the average total assets 
(ROA).In model one, we do not control for firm characteristics. In model two, we control for only 
customer characteristics. In model three, we control for only supplier characteristics. In model four, 
we control for both customer and supplier characteristics. Year fixed effects and supplier-customer 
pair fixed effects are included in all regressions. The customer characteristics include Log (Sale), 
R&D, Mkt Lev, Tobin's Q, and Log (Firm Age). The supplier characteristics include Firm Size, 
ROA, Tobin's Q, PPE, BHAR, Div Payer, ∆Sales Growth, %Loss, Sales Vol, Cash Flow Vol, and 
Log (Firm Age). All the variables are defined in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered at the customer-supplier pair level are reported, and t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  F. Earnings F. Earnings F. Earnings F. Earnings 
Earnings* MA Imp Dummy 
*Post 
0.585** 0.580** 0.552*** 0.546*** 
 (2.25) (2.26) (2.63) (2.65) 
Earnings* MA Imp Dummy -0.106 -0.108 -0.180* -0.180* 
 (-1.04) (-1.07) (-1.73) (-1.72) 
Earnings*Post -0.118 -0.122 -0.070 -0.073 
 (-1.42) (-1.46) (-0.92) (-0.93) 
Earnings 0.208*** 0.213*** 0.258*** 0.260*** 
 (3.21) (3.29) (3.86) (3.88) 
Cus Log(Sale)  -0.006  -0.005 
  (-0.28)  (-0.29) 
Cus R&D  -0.683*  -0.565* 
  (-1.86)  (-1.73) 
Cus Mkt Lev  -0.027  -0.029 
  (-1.02)  (-1.28) 
Cus Tobin's Q  0.006  0.004 
  (0.58)  (0.46) 
Cus Log (Firm Age)  -0.069  -0.073* 
  (-1.53)  (-1.77) 
Sup Firm Size   -0.038*** -0.038*** 
   (-3.04) (-2.97) 
Sup Tobin's Q   -0.009* -0.009* 
   (-1.73) (-1.73) 
Sup PPE   -0.088 -0.100 




Table 6. The Customer’s Managerial Ability and the Supplier’s Earnings Persistence 
(Cont.) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  F. Earnings F. Earnings F. Earnings F. Earnings 
Sup BHAR   0.007 0.008* 
   (1.58) (1.79) 
Sup Div. Payer   -0.013 -0.012 
   (-1.02) (-0.92) 
Sup ∆Sales Growth   0.009 0.008 
   (0.94) (0.86) 
Sup %Loss   0.122*** 0.117*** 
   (3.32) (3.38) 
Sup Sales Vol   0.007 0.007 
   (0.15) (0.17) 
Sup Cash Flow Vol   -0.301* -0.294* 
   (-1.70) (-1.69) 
Sup Operating Cycle   -0.025 -0.025 
   (-0.86) (-0.86) 
Sup Log (Firm Age)   0.033 0.052 
   (0.87) (1.43) 
Constant 0.021*** 0.327 0.107 0.377 
 (15.36) (1.42) (0.79) (1.44) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.725 0.727 0.745 0.747 






Table 7. The Customer’s Managerial Ability and the Supplier’s Credit Ratings 
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of the supplier’s credit ratings on the customer’s 
managerial ability. The dependent variable is the dependent supplier’s Standard & Poor's credit 
ratings. The conversion from the Standard & Poor’s ratings to the numerical ratings is defined in 
Appendix B. The key independent variable is the interaction term Post* MA Imp Dummy. In model 
one, we do not control for firm characteristics. In model two, we control for only customer 
characteristics. In model three, we control for only supplier characteristics. In model four, we 
control for both customer and supplier characteristics. Year fixed effects and supplier-customer 
pair fixed effects are included in all regressions. The customer characteristics include Log (Sale), 
R&D, Mkt Lev, Tobin's Q, and Log (Firm Age). The supplier characteristics include Firm Size, 
PPE, ROA, Sales Growth, BTM, R&D, Subordinate Debt, Mkt Lev, Institutional Ownership, 
Interest Coverage, %Loss, Analyst Coverage, Div Payer, Return Vol, Accrual Quality, and Log 
(Firm Age). All the variables are defined in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered at the customer-supplier pair level are reported, and t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 










Post* MA Imp Dummy 1.185*** 1.115*** 0.753*** 0.760*** 
 (4.99) (4.49) (3.96) (3.47) 
Post -0.252 -0.182 -0.074 -0.041 
 (-1.48) (-1.12) (-0.50) (-0.29) 
Cus Log(Sale)  0.414  0.247 
  (0.94)  (0.70) 
Cus R&D  14.114**  6.347 
  (2.09)  (1.31) 
Cus Mkt Lev  0.193  0.236 
  (0.59)  (0.95) 
Cus Tobin's Q  -0.146  -0.094 
  (-0.80)  (-0.59) 
Cus Log (Firm Age)  -1.821  -1.682 
  (-0.80)  (-0.76) 
Sup Firm Size   0.633** 0.598** 
   (2.53) (2.27) 
Sup PPE   3.283** 3.622** 
   (2.04) (2.28) 
Sup ROA   3.895*** 3.631** 
   (2.63) (2.47) 
Sup Sales Growth   -0.243 -0.153 
   (-0.84) (-0.54) 
Sup BMT   -0.007*** -0.007*** 




Table 7. The Customer’s Managerial Ability and the Supplier’s Credit Ratings (Cont.) 










Sup R&D   -0.597 -0.645 
   (-0.37) (-0.40) 
Sup Sub Debt   0.485* 0.416* 
   (1.69) (1.82) 
Sup Mkt Lev   -2.108*** -2.122*** 
   (-3.67) (-3.72) 
Sup Institutional 
Ownership   0.000 0.000 
   (0.67) (0.53) 
Sup Interest Coverage   0.001 0.001 
   (1.53) (1.51) 
Sup Loss Percentage   -1.643** -1.570** 
   (-2.29) (-2.18) 
Sup Analyst Coverage   0.045*** 0.044** 
   (2.68) (2.52) 
Sup Div Payer   -0.074 -0.076 
   (-0.30) (-0.31) 
Sup Return Vol   -1.201 -1.322 
   (-1.25) (-1.33) 
Sup Accrual Quality   1.441 1.362 
   (1.42) (1.31) 
Sup Log (Firm Age)   -0.233 -0.290 
   (-0.46) (-0.59) 
Constant 11.509*** 13.373 6.482*** 10.155 
 (165.16) (1.65) (2.78) (1.31) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.917 0.918 0.939 0.939 






Table 8. The Customer’s Managerial Ability and the Supplier’s Leverage 
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of the supplier’s leverage on the customer’s 
managerial ability. The dependent variable is the supplier’s market leverage. The key independent 
variable is the interaction term Post* MA Imp Dummy. In model one, we do not control for firm 
characteristics. In model two, we control for only customer characteristics. In model three, we 
control for only supplier characteristics. In model four, we control for both customer and supplier 
characteristics. Year fixed effects and supplier-customer pair fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. The customer characteristics include Log (Sale), R&D, Mkt Lev, Tobin's Q, and Log 
(Firm Age). The supplier characteristics include Firm Size, ROA, Sales Growth, Tobin's Q, PPE, 
Div Payer, Cash Flow Vol, Ind Median Lev, and Log (Firm Age). All the variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the customer-supplier pair 
level are reported, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 










Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.110* 0.107* 0.113* 0.109* 
 (1.70) (1.68) (1.73) (1.71) 
Post -0.134** -0.155** -0.137** -0.159** 
 (-2.00) (-2.22) (-2.04) (-2.26) 
Cus Log(Sale)  0.156  0.154 
  (1.48)  (1.39) 
Cus R&D  -0.899  -0.833 
  (-0.79)  (-0.69) 
Cus Mkt Lev  0.100*  0.100** 
  (1.90)  (1.98) 
Cus Tobin's Q  0.080  0.083 
  (1.34)  (1.38) 
Cus Log (Firm Age)  -0.022  -0.043 
  (-0.13)  (-0.25) 
Sup Firm Size   0.071 0.074 
   (1.00) (0.96) 
Sup ROA   -0.251*** -0.265*** 
   (-2.81) (-2.87) 
Sup Sales Growth   0.113* 0.107* 
   (1.87) (1.86) 
Sup Tobin's Q   -0.009* -0.009 
   (-1.72) (-1.59) 
Sup PPE   -0.242 -0.204 
   (-0.79) (-0.70) 
Sup Div Payer   0.007 0.007 





Table 8. The Customer’s Managerial Ability and the Supplier’s Leverage (Cont.) 










Sup Cash Flow Vol   0.910** 0.921** 
   (2.28) (2.25) 
Sup Ind Median Lev   -0.005 -0.012 
   (-0.02) (-0.04) 
Sup Log (Firm Age)   0.088 0.086 
   (0.41) (0.43) 
Constant 0.080*** -1.470 -0.583 -2.070 
 (2.74) (-1.12) (-1.43) (-1.53) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.340 0.343 0.344 0.347 






Table 9. The Customer’s Managerial Ability and the Supplier’s Performance 
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of dependent supplier’s firm performance on the 
customer’s managerial ability. The dependent variable is the supplier’s Tobin’s Q. The key 
independent variable is the interaction term Post* MA Imp Dummy. In model one, we do not 
control for firm characteristics. In model two, we control for only customer characteristics. In 
model three, we control for only supplier characteristics. In model four, we control for both 
customer and supplier characteristics. Year fixed effects and supplier-customer pair fixed effects 
are included in all regressions. The customer characteristics include Log (Sale), R&D, Mkt Lev, 
Tobin's Q, and Log (Firm Age). The supplier characteristics include Firm Size, ROA, Sales Growth, 
Tobin's Q, PPE, Capex, Div Payer, Cash Flow Vol, and Log (Firm Age). All the variables are 
defined in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the customer-
supplier pair level are reported, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  F. Tobin's Q F. Tobin's Q F. Tobin's Q F. Tobin's Q 
Post* MA Imp Dummy 0.466* 0.450* 0.445** 0.434** 
 (1.84) (1.94) (2.14) (2.29) 
Post -0.144 -0.148 -0.114 -0.121 
 (-1.45) (-1.61) (-1.17) (-1.22) 
Cus Log(Sale)  -0.298  -0.064 
  (-1.60)  (-0.33) 
Cus R&D  2.794  0.845 
  (0.75)  (0.22) 
Cus Mkt Lev  0.172*  0.138 
  (1.70)  (1.39) 
Cus Tobin's Q  0.170*  0.084 
  (1.72)  (0.77) 
Cus Log (Firm Age)  -0.025  0.182 
  (-0.02)  (0.16) 
Sup Firm Size   -1.220*** -1.202*** 
   (-4.74) (-4.53) 
Sup ROA   0.922 0.930 
   (1.23) (1.23) 
Sup Sale Growth   -0.091 -0.095 
   (-0.45) (-0.49) 
Sup PPE   -2.642** -2.555** 
   (-2.28) (-2.26) 
Sup Capex   -0.892 -0.876 
   (-0.85) (-0.86) 
Sup R&D   3.939 3.980 




Table 9. The Customer’s Managerial Ability and the Supplier’s Performance (Cont.) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  F. Tobin's Q F. Tobin's Q F. Tobin's Q F. Tobin's Q 
Sup Mkt Lev   0.007 0.006 
   (0.73) (0.54) 
Sup Div Payer   0.102 0.102 
   (1.10) (1.10) 
Sup Cash Flow Vol   0.585 0.527 
   (0.45) (0.39) 
Sup Log (Firm Age)   -0.329 -0.342 
   (-0.82) (-0.84) 
Constant 2.121*** 4.836 10.262*** 10.048*** 
 (46.19) (1.54) (5.48) (4.04) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.524 0.525 0.568 0.567 







Table 10. The Customer’s Managerial Ability and the Supplier’s Managerial Ability for 
the Full Sample 
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of the supplier’s managerial ability on the 
customer’s managerial ability for the full sample of all pairs of customer-supplier pair year 
observations. The dependent variable is the supplier’s managerial ability score (MA Score). The 
key independent variable is Positive MA Change, a dummy variable that equals one if a customer’s 
MA score of the current year is greater than that of last year and zero otherwise. In model one, we 
do not control for firm characteristics. In model two, we control for only customer characteristics. 
In model three, we control for only supplier characteristics. In model four, we control for both 
customer and supplier characteristics. Year fixed effects and supplier-customer pair fixed effects 
are included in all regressions. The customer characteristics include Log (Sale), R&D, Mkt Lev, 
Tobin's Q, and Log (Firm Age). The supplier characteristics include Firm Size, ROA, Sales Growth, 
Log (Firm Age), Tobin’s Q, PPE, Mkt Lev, and Div Payer. All the variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the customer-supplier pair 
level are reported, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respective. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  F. MA Score F. MA Score F. MA Score F. MA Score 
Positive MA Change 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (3.55) (3.66) (2.72) (2.86) 
Cus. Log(Sale)  -0.005  -0.000 
  (-1.33)  (-0.07) 
Cus. R&D  -0.060  -0.067 
  (-1.07)  (-1.21) 
Cus.  Mkt. Lev.  -0.001*  -0.001 
  (-1.86)  (-1.59) 
Cus. Tobin's Q  0.002*  0.001 
  (1.90)  (1.13) 
Cus. Firm Age  0.007  0.013* 
  (0.96)  (1.87) 
Sup. Firm Size   -0.027*** -0.028*** 
   (-15.44) (-15.44) 
Sup. ROA   0.025*** 0.024*** 
   (5.43) (5.39) 
Sup Sales Growth   0.010*** 0.010*** 
   (5.23) (5.23) 
Sup. Firm Age   -0.006 -0.008* 
   (-1.41) (-1.69) 
Sup. Tobin's Q   0.000 0.000 
   (0.86) (0.86) 
Sup. PPE   -0.079*** -0.079*** 




Table 10. The Customer’s Managerial Ability and the Supplier’s Managerial Ability for 
the Full Sample (Cont.) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  F. MA Score F. MA Score F. MA Score F. MA Score 
Sup. Mkt. Lev.   0.000** 0.000** 
   (2.21) (2.27) 
Sup. Div. Payer   0.014*** 0.014*** 
   (5.79) (5.88) 
Sup Business Segment 
Concentration   -0.000 -0.000 
   (-0.02) (-0.02) 
Sup Positive Free Cash Flow   0.013*** 0.013*** 
   (11.07) (11.08) 
Sup Market Share   0.246* 0.251* 
   (1.83) (1.88) 
Constant 0.002*** 0.024 0.176*** 0.141*** 
 (3.83) (0.67) (12.30) (3.82) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cus-Sup FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.602 0.602 0.613 0.614 







Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definitions 
MA Score The managerial efficiency score constructed by Demerjian et al. 
(2012). 
EF Score The firm efficiency score constructed by Demerjian et al. (2012). 
MA Imp Dummy A dummy variable that measures whether the incoming customer 
CEO is more able than the outgoing CEO. Specifically, we compare 
the outgoing CEOs’ average managerial ability score over the last 
three years before the turnover with the incoming CEOs’ average 
managerial ability score over the same periods (measured in their 
prior firms) [t-3, t-1]. 
Positive MA Change Dummy variable equal to one if a customer’s MA score of the 
current year is greater than that of last year and zero otherwise. 
Post Dummy variable equal to one if the time of the observation is within 
three years after customer CEOs take office. 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Log (Sales) Natural logarithm of total sales. 
ROA The ratio of operating income after depreciation to the average total 
assets. 
R&D The ratio of R&D expenditures to the average total assets, where 
R&D expenditures are set to zero if missing. 
Tobin's Q The ratio of the market value of assets (sum of long-term debt, 
short-term debt, and market capitalizations) to the book value of 
total assets. 
BTM The ratio of the book value of common equity to the market value 
of common equity. 
Mkt Lev The ratio of total debt (long term debt plus short term debt minus 
cash) to total debt plus the market value of equity. 
Ind Median Mkt Lev The median market leverage of the Fama French 48 industry. 
Int Cov The ratio of EBIT to interest expenses. 
Sales Growth The sales growth rate is the percentage increase in total sales from 
the last year. 
∆Sales Growth Current year's sales growth minus prior year's sales growth. 
Div Payer Dummy variable equal to one if a firm pays dividends. 
BHAR Market-adjusted buy-and-hold annual abnormal stock return. 
%Loss The percentage of years reporting losses in EBIT over at least three 
of the last five years [t-4, t]. 
Sales Vol The standard deviation of the ratio of sales to average assets over at 
least three of the last five years [t-4, t]. 
ROA Vol The standard deviation of the ROA over at least three of the last five 




Appendix A. Variable Definitions (Cont.) 
Variable Definitions 
Cash Flow Vol The standard deviation of the ratio of cash flow from operations to 
average assets over at least three of the last five years [t–4, t]. 
Return Vol The standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the 36-month 
period ending [t–2, t]. 
Operating Cycle The natural log of the length of the firm’s operating cycle, defined 
as sales turnover plus days in inventory [(SALE/360)/(average 
RECT) + (COGS/360)/(average INVT)] and is averaged over at 
least three of the last five years [t-4, t]. 
Log (Firm Age) Natural logarithm of the firm age, where the firm age is the number 
of years the firm has been listed on Compustat. 
Business Segment 
Concentration 
The sum of the squared ratio of individual business segment sales to 
total sales across all business segments for year t. If a firm is not in 
the segment file, it is assigned a concentration of one. 
Positive Free Cash 
Flow 
Dummy variable equal to one when a firm has positive free cash 
flow (defined as earnings before depreciation and amortization 
(OIBDP) less the change in working capital (RECT+INVT+ACO-
LCO-AP) less capital expenditures (CAPX)) in year t. 
Market Share The percentage of revenues earned by the firm within its Fama 
French 48 industry in year t. 
Institutional Ownership Percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders. 
Analyst Coverage The number of analysts who follow the firms within 180 days 
before the end of the fiscal year. 
Interest Coverage Operating income before depreciation and interest expense divided 
by interest expense. 
KZ-index The financial constraint index developed by following Baker, Stein, 
and Wurgler (2003). Specifically, we adopt the four-variable 










3.139𝐿𝐸𝑉 , where 
𝐶𝐹
𝐴
 is the cash flow over total assets, 
𝐷𝐼𝑉
𝐴
 is the 
cash dividend over total assets, 
𝐶
𝐴
 is the cash balance over total 
assets. 
∆Sales Current year's sales minus prior year's sales scaled by beginning 
total assets. 
CFO Cash flow from operations scaled by beginning total assets. 
ACCR Income before extraordinary items plus extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations minus cash flow from operations scaled by 
beginning total assets following Hribar and Collins (2002). 








Appendix A. Variable Definitions (Cont.) 
Variable Definitions 
Capex The ratio of capital expenditures to book value of total assets. 
Inverse Asset The inverse of total assets. 
Accrual Quality The product of  -1 and standard deviation of εt+1, εt+2, εt+3, and εt+4, 
where εt+n is the residual from the model (3) suggested by 






Appendix B.  Bond Ratings 
Credit Risk Standard & Poor's Numerical rating 
Highest quality AAA 22 
High quality AA+, AA, AA- 21, 20, 19 
Upper medium A+, A, A- 18, 17, 16 
Medium BBB+, BBB, BBB- 15, 14, 13 
Not investment grade BB+, BB, BB- 12, 11, 10 
Speculative lower grade B+, B, B- 9, 8, 7 
Speculative risky CCC+, CCC, CCC- 6, 5, 4 
Speculative poor standing CC 3 
Highly vulnerable C 2 
In default D 1 
Note. The mappings from the Standard & Poor’s ratings to the numerical ratings are based on 










It is well-known that innovation is vital for a firm to achieve and sustain its competitive advantage. 
Nevertheless, not all firms are willing to invest their human and capital resources in innovative 
projects for several reasons. The ability of a firm to recognize the value of new external 
information and commercialize it varies across firms, which is critical to its innovative capabilities 
(Cohen and Levinthal (1990)).  In addition, investments of innovation are risky, and innovation is 
associated with the exploration of new untested approaches with a high probability of failure (e.g., 
Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone (2002); Manso (2011)). Moreover, R&D expenditures decrease 
firms’ income as most R&D investments are expensed as they are incurred. Therefore, a firm’s 
access to valuable information could affect its willingness to innovate.  
In this paper, we examine whether the social network connections of Chief Technology 
Officers (CTOs) affect corporate innovation. The CTO is the highest technological manager in a 
firm and is the person who directly oversees the corporate innovation process. A well-connected 
CTO can facilitate corporate innovation for several reasons. Frist, better-connected CTOs have 
access to more valuable information and resources and have more opportunities to identify and 
explore the most recent technology knowledge, ideas, and trends, which decreases the ex-ante risk 
of the R&D investment and fosters innovation. Second, a well-connected CTO is well known in a 
certain field and could attract many talented inventors and build successful teams of inventors, 
which will lead to high-quality innovation outcomes. Third, the biggest cost resulting from the 
innovation failure for CTOs might be the loss of employment. The personal connections of a well-
connected CTO increase the likelihood of re-employment should the CTO lose his/her job (e.g., 
Mazerolle and Singh (2004); Cingano and Rosolia (2012)), therefore lowering the ex-post risks of 




Using R&D data from 2000 to 2014 and patent and citation data from 2000 to 2006, we 
find that firms with better connected CTOs are associated with more R&D investments more 
patents granted from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and more citations 
per patent, suggesting that firms with higher centrality CTO not only invest more in innovation 
but also generate more high-quality innovation outputs. The results are not only statistically 
significant but also economically significant. Holding other factors constant, moving the 
eigenvector (degree) centrality from the 10th percentile to 90th percentile, firms invest an additional 
4.7 (4.3) percent of their assets in R&D, and receives 17 (13) percent more patents and 31 (27) 
percent more citations per patent.  
If the social network connections truly matter for corporate innovation, then the 
connections of one CTO with other CTOs should also correlate with corporate innovation, as the 
social network connections among CTOs serve as a direct information channel where innovative 
ideas can be more easily exchanged and identified. Consistent with our expectation, we find that 
professional network centrality constructed based on the sample of CTOs is positively correlated 
with R&D investments and the quality of the innovation. Besides, we find that firms with CTOs 
who share no social network connection to other CTOs are associated with significantly fewer 
innovation investments and receive fewer well-cited patents, implying the importance of 
professional network connections. 
We address the potential endogenous issue using the instrumental variables approach. The 
instrumental variable we use is a binary variable which is equal to one if the CTO has a graduate 
degree. The idea is that a CTO who earns a graduate degree, such as an MBA degree, has more 




associated with innovation. Our baseline results are qualitatively similar after running two-stage 
least square regressions (2SLS).  
One might suspect that it might be the centrality of CEOs rather than CTOs that drives the 
results, as Faleye, Kovacs, and Venkateswaran (2015) find that firms with higher centrality CEOs 
are associated with more investments in corporate innovation. To address this concern, we control 
for CEO centrality in the regressions. We find that after controlling for the centrality of CEOs, the 
centrality of CTOs is still positive and significantly correlated with corporate innovation. Thus, 
our results are not purely driven by the centrality of CEOs. 
 García-Morales, Jiménez-Barrionuevo, and Gutiérrez-Gutiérrez (2012) document a 
positive relationship between internal communication and organizational innovation in 
technological firms. We next examine whether the CTOs who are hired by the incumbent CEOs 
are associated with more innovation activities. CEOs are more likely to trust and support the CTOs 
they hire, which might facilitate the communication between CEOs and CTOs and expedite the 
innovation process. We find that firms invest more in innovation, generate more patents, and 
receive more patent citations after a new CTO is hired. 
Another concern is that our results are driven by reverse causality. Specifically, the success 
of the innovation may lead to more social network connections. For example, it is likely that other 
firms will reach out to the successful CTOs and invite them to sit on their board, which increases 
the CTOs’ social network connections. To address this reverse causality issue, we regress the 
innovation variables three years in the future on the current year CTO centrality. We find a 
consistent positive relationship between CTO social network centrality and future corporate 




Our paper is closely related to the growing literature showing that social ties formed 
through past employment, shared university, or other social activities, can facilitate the 
communication of information, exchange of resources, and formation of a new relationship. Most 
of the prior literature focuses on the social network connections of board members and CEOs. For 
example, Haunschild and Beckman (1998) show that boardroom networks represent a channel of 
communication or resource exchange between companies through which value-enhancing 
business innovation can spread. Larcker, So, and Wang (2013)  provide evidence that firms with 
relatively better-connected boards earn significantly higher future returns. Engelberg, Gao, and 
Parsons (2012) report that interpersonal linkages between banks and firms lead to more favorable 
financing terms, suggesting that social networks lead to either better information flow or better 
monitoring. Cohen Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010) document that social networks allow sell-
side analysts to gather superior information about firms. Our paper contributes to the social 
network literature by adding the impact of the centrality of CTOs on corporate innovation.  
Our results also contribute to the literature that examines the determinates of corporate 
innovation. For example, Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) find that firms with overconfident 
CEOs invest more in innovation, and receive more patents and patent citations. Mukherjee, Singh, 
and Žaldokas (2017) show that an increase in taxes reduces future innovation. Baranchuk, 
Kieschnick, and Moussawi (2014) report that managers are better motivated to pursue innovation 
when they are given more incentive compensation with longer vesting periods. We contribute to 
the literature by providing evidence that social network connections among CTOs facilitate 
corporate innovation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 




correlation coefficients of the dependent and independent variables. Section 3 discusses our 
empirical results. Section 4 presents our robustness checks. Section 5 provides the summary and 
conclusions for our study. 
 
2. Data and sample description 
Our sample consists of all the public firms that have the Chief Technology Officer position (or the 
equivalent positions) in BoardEx.28 BoardEx provides detailed biographical information of the 
board members and the top managers of public and private companies around the world, such as 
past educational experiences, work experiences, and social activities. We collect patents and patent 
citation data from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent database, which is 
provided by Bronwyn Hall’s website. Since the patent data end in 2006, our sample period for the 
patents and patent citations has to end in 2006.29 We obtain accounting data from Compustat. Since 
R&D investment data are collected from Compustat, we can use a larger sample for R&D 
investments. Our R&D investment sample spans from 2000 to 2014, while our patent and patent 
citation sample runs from 2000 to 2006. We first merge the firms with CTO positions from 
BoardEx with Compustat and then merge with patent data obtained from Bronwyn Hall’s website. 
There are 11,917 firm-year observations for 2,971 unique CTOs in 2,087 unique firms in our R&D 
sample, while there are 5,633 firm-year observations for 1,717 CTOs in 1,639 unique firms in our 
 
28 Some firms do not have CTO positions, but have other positions, such as senior vice president of research and 
development. For firms that do not have CTO positions, we simply treat the highest technology position in the firm 
as the CTO. 
29 On average, it takes two years for a patent to be granted after an application is filed. Therefore, we do not know 
whether a patent application that was filed in 2006 has been granted or not. To address the issue, we run a robustness 




patent sample. All the accounting variables and innovation variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 
percentile to minimize the impact of the potential outliers. 
2.1. Definition of corporate innovation 
We use three variables to measure corporate innovation. Following most of the innovation 
literature (e.g., Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012)), the first measure is R&D investment, which is 
measured by the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets. We set R&D investment to zero when 
the R&D expenses are missing from Compustat. Since R&D investments are just the input to the 
innovation activity and tell us nothing about the outcomes of the input, we adopt two other 
variables to gauge the quality of the innovation, including the number of patents received by each 
company from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the average citations 
per patent as the indicator of the quality of the innovation input. We set the number of patents to 
zero if there is no patent received by a certain firm in a certain year. Similarly, we set the average 
citation to zero, if there is no patent in a given year. We use the patent application year instead of 
the year when patents are granted because the time of the patent application is closer to when the 
innovation expenses are incurred. Due to the finite length of the sample, patent citations suffer 
from a time truncation bias. Since citations will be received many years after a patent is granted, 
patents that were granted close to 2006 have less time to accumulate citations. To address this 
issue, we adjust the citation count of each patent by multiplying the weighting index from the 
NBER patent database, following Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001). 
2.2. Definition of social network centrality 
We adopt two measures of social network centrality. The first measure is Degree centrality, which 




private employer, have some period overlap when going to the same university, or share other 
social experiences, such as charity experiences.30  A CTO is well-connected if he/she possesses 
relatively more channels of communication, through which information or ideas are exchanged. 
Let 𝑙𝑖,𝑗  denote an indicator that individuals i and j have a least one link through the activities 
described above. 
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖  = ∑ 𝑙𝑖,𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖
 
The second measure we use is Eigenvector centrality, which is a refined Degree centrality 
measure from Bonacich (1972). The Eigenvector centrality captures whether the individuals that 
a CTO connects to are also well-connected. In other words, Eigenvector centrality captures 
whether the CTO’s direct connections are influential or not. Let’s denote G as the adjacency matrix, 
where g𝑖,𝑗 equals one when individual i and j are connected and zero otherwise. The Eigenvector 
centrality is obtained by solving the following equation. 
λ ∙ E = G ∙ E 
We utilize two sets of social networks, the general network, and the professional network. 
The general network centrality is created based on the universe of BoardEx, while the professional 
network centrality is created based on our subsample of Chief Technology Officers. To make our 
centrality measures comparable across years, we group our centrality measure into percentile (1 to 
100), where a higher value indicates higher network centrality. 31  We then take the natural 
logarithm of the percentile of the centrality measure.  
 
30 Our results remain unchanged if we restrict the connections only to past public or private firm work experiences. 
31 In untabulated analysis, we conduct a robustness test using the raw measure of the centrality, and the results are 




2.3. Definition of control variables 
We control for Firm Size, Leverage, and Tobin’s q that prior literature shows affect corporate 
innovation. For example, Shefer and Frenkel (2005) and Atanassov (2013) show that larger firms 
tend to innovate more than smaller ones because of economies of scale and scope. Brown, Fazzari, 
and Petersen (2009) and Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2011) find that financially constrained firms 
tend to invest less in innovation because of the managerial risk aversion and limited resources 
available for risky long-term projects. They also suggest that firms with more growth options tend 
to innovate more in order to exploit the potential growth opportunities. We measure the Firm Size 
by the natural logarithm of total assets, Leverage by the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, and 
Tobin’s q by the ratio of market assets to book assets, where market assets are the book value of 
total debt plus the market value of equity. 
2.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for our dependent variables and independent variables. 
The sample firms are relatively large and firm size is positively skewed. The mean (median) total 
assets are $11 billion ($0.3 billion).32 The median R&D to asset ratio is 6%, while the median 
patents and citations per patent are 0, suggesting that more than half of firms in our sample do not 
engage in patentable innovation. The average R&D, patents, and citations per patent are 12%, 16.2, 
and 20.51 respectively. 
Table 1 shows that the average percentile of CTO degree (eigenvector) centrality in the 
BoardEx universe is 63 (64), and the median is 67 (68), suggesting that CTOs’ centrality is above 
 
32 Most of the firms in the BoardEx are S&P1500 firms. BoardEx initially covers almost only S&P 1500 firms. From 
2008, after the company got more funding, it started to add more existing companies, but it did not backfill data, as 




the median centrality of the BoardEx universe. Since a CTO is one of the top executive positions 
in a firm, he/she on average tends to be better connected than other individuals in the BoardEx. 
The professional network centrality of CTOs is slightly negatively skewed. The average degree 
(eigenvector) centrality is 46 (48), while the median is 48 (50). This is because more than 10 
percent of the CTOs in our sample share only one or zero social network connection with other 
CTOs, as the 10th percentile professional degree centrality is 1. 
2.5. Correlation 
Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients of our dependent and independent variables. Consistent 
with prior literature, firm size is negatively correlated with R&D to asset ratio but positively 
correlated with patents and patent citations. Both general and professional CTO centrality are 
significantly and positively correlated with R&D investments, patents, and citations per patent. A 
person who has more connections to other persons is more likely to share connections with persons 
who also have more connections, and a person who is central in the general network tends to be 
central in the professional network as well. Therefore, the correlation coefficient between any of 
two the network centrality measures is very high, with the minimum correlation coefficients 
among them being 0.6.  
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1. CTO network centrality and corporate innovation 
3.1.1. Baseline results 
In Table 3, we examine whether firms with CTOs who are better connected are associated with 




expenditures to assets ratio, the natural logarithm of one plus the number of granted patents, and 
the natural logarithm of one plus average citations per patent, respectively. We use the ordinary 
least square (OLS) regressions to estimate the results. In the models with patents and patent 
citations as the dependent variable, we also control for R&D expenditures to assets ratio, as the 
number of patents granted and citations received might be correlated with R&D investments. In 
each model, we control for Fama and French 48 industry fixed effect and year fixed effect to 
account for industry differences in the level of innovation and common shocks to all the firms over 
time. 
We first examine the effect of CTOs’ general network centrality on corporate innovation. 
In panel A, the first (last) three models show that CTOs with high eigenvector (degree) centrality 
are associated with more R&D expenditures, more patents, and more citations per patent. The 
coefficients of all the centrality variables are statistically significant at the one percent level. These 
effects are not only statistically significant but also economically significant. Specifically, holding 
other variables constant, moving the eigenvector (degree) centrality from the 10th percentile to 90th 
percentile, firms invests an additional 4.7 % (4.3%) of their assets in R&D. 33  Because the 
unconditional mean for the R&D to asset ratio is 12%, this represents a 40 (36) percent increase. 
Similarly, moving the eigenvector (degree) centrality from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile, 
firms receive 17 (13) percent more patents and 31 (27) percent more citations per patent. 
We then examine the effects of CTOs’ professional networks on corporate innovation. 
Since the social network connections among CTOs serve as a direct information channel where 
innovative ideas can be more easily exchanged and identified, we conjecture that CTOs with high 
 
33 The coefficient of CTO eigenvector centrality in model 1 is 0.062, the 10th percentile eigenvector centrality is 16 
and the 90th percentile centrality is 93. The increase in R&D to assets ratios when eigenvector centrality moves from 




centrality in the CTO network engage in more R&D investments and receive more and higher 
quality patents. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 3. Panel B1 (B2) reports the regression 
results using the eigenvector (degree) centrality of CTOs’ professional network as the key 
independent variable of interest. Consistent with our conjecture, both the eigenvector and degree 
centrality of the professional network are positively correlated with R&D investments and patent 
quality.  
There is a concern that since the CTOs’ general network centrality and professional 
network centrality are highly correlated, and the effects of the professional network might be 
subsumed in the general network. To address this multi-collinearity issue, we first create 
orthogonalized centrality variable based on a modified Gram–Schmidt procedure and then put the 
two orthogonalized centrality variables into the regressions.34 The results are reported in Panel C. 
Panel C shows that both the general network centrality and the professional network centrality are 
positively associated with innovation investments, patents, and citations per patent. The results 
indicate that besides the CTO centrality of the general network, the CTO centrality of the 
professional network also fosters innovation activities and innovation quality. The coefficients of 
all the centrality variables are significant at the one percent level. 
Next, we examine whether degree centrality and eigenvector centrality capture different 
aspects of the social network. Similar to Panel C, we create the orthogonalized version of degree 
centrality for both the general network (first three models) and the professional network (last three 
models). The results in Panel D show that the coefficients of eigenvector centrality are significant 
across all models, and the coefficients of the orthogonalized degree centrality are significant in 
 
34 For example, in Panel C of Table 3, the centrality of general network is the demeaned measure of the same 
variable, while the centrality of the professional network is the residuals from the regression of the general network 




four out of six models, suggesting that eigenvector centrality and degree centrality capture 
different aspects of social network centrality, both of which affect corporate innovation. 
3.1.2. Instrumental variable regressions 
To address the potential endogeneity issue due to unobservable factors, we estimate two-stage least 
square (2SLS) regressions. A good instrument should have no direct effects on the dependent 
variable, but indirect effects through their effects on the endogenous variable in question. The 
instrumental variable we use is a binary variable which is equal to one if a CTO has a graduate 
degree. The idea is that a CTO who earns a graduate degree, such as an MBA degree, shares more 
connections with others through past education, but it is unclear whether such a degree is directly 
associated with innovation. We report the results of the second stage of the 2SLS regressions for 
the general network and professional network in Panel E and Panel F respectively. The coefficients 
of all CTO centrality variables are positive and significant. The results provide further support for 
a positive correlation between CTO centrality and corporate innovation.  
To sum up, Table 3 shows that the CTO centrality of both the general network and the 
professional network is positively associated with R&D investments and high-quality patents. 
Moreover, professional centrality has an incremental effect on corporate innovation. In addition, 
both eigenvector centrality and degree centrality are positively correlated with R&D investments, 
patents, and citations per patent, and they capture different aspects of social network centrality. 
3.2. CTO and CEO network centrality, and corporate innovation 
One might suspect that it is the CEO centrality rather than the CTO centrality that affects corporate 
innovation. For example, Faleye, Kovacs, and Venkateswaran (2015) show the CEOs with more 




address this issue, we create an orthogonalized version of the CEO centrality of the general 
network and control for it in Table 4. Panel A reports the results of the regression of innovation on 
CTO centrality of the general network and orthogonalized CEO centrality of the general network. 
The first (last) three columns use the eigenvector (degree) centrality as the key independent 
variables of interest. The results suggest that the general network centrality of both CTOs and 
CEOs are positively correlated with innovation, as the coefficients of all the centrality measures 
of CTOs and CEOs are positively correlated with corporate innovation, except for model 2. The 
results indicate that both CTO centrality and CEO centrality are positively correlated with the 
R&D investments, patents, and citations per patent.  
In Panel B, we use the professional network centrality of CTOs and CEOs as opposed to 
general network centrality as the key independent variable of interest. We find that the results are 
qualitatively similar to Panel A. 
3.3. CTOs hired by CEOs and corporate innovation 
In this section, we examine whether firms with CTOs that are hired by the incumbent CEOs invest 
more in R&D and receive more high-quality patents. Given that the R&D investments are risky, 
the CEOs are more likely to trust the CTOs they hire and are more willing to offer them financial 
and human resource support. We first construct a dummy variable CTO hired by CEO, which takes 
the value of one if a CTO is hired after the incumbent CEO takes office, and zero otherwise. The 
results are reported in Table 5. In the first three models, the key independent variable of interest is 
CTO hired by the CEO.  In the last three models, we include the interaction between Centrality 
and CTO hired by the CEO dummy. Panel A reports the results using the eigenvector centrality in 
the general network as a proxy for the connectedness of CTOs. The coefficients of CTO hired by 




only statistically significant but also economically significant. On average, after a CTO is hired by 
the incumbent CEO, firms invest additional 0.8 percent of assets in R&D, and receive 35 percent 
more patents and 25 percent more citations per patent. In models 4 to 6, the coefficients of the 
interaction term are positive and significant at the one percent level, which suggests that the 
relationship between the innovation and CTO centrality becomes stronger after a new CTO is hired 
by the incumbent CEO.  
In panel B, C, and D, instead of using the CTO eigenvector centrality from the general 
network, we use degree centrality from the general network, eigenvector centrality from the 
professional network, and degree centrality from the professional network, respectively, as proxies 
for the connectedness of the CTOs. The results are very similar to panel A. The coefficients of the 
dummy variable and the interaction term are consistently positive and significant. In addition, the 
coefficients of all the centrality variables remain positive and significant. 
In conclusion, after a new CTO is hired, a firm invests more in innovation and receives 
more patents and citations per patent. In addition, the R&D investments and the quality of 
innovation are more sensitive to CTO centrality after a CTO is hired by the incumbent CEO. 
3.4. Unaffiliated CTOs and corporate innovation 
In this section, we examine whether firms with CTOs who share no social network connection 
with other CTOs invest less in R&D and receive fewer patents and fewer citations per patent. The 
idea is that CTOs with no connections to other CTOs have access to less technical information and 
might have less innovative ideas. Therefore, the managers are less willing to invest in innovation, 




To examine this effect, we created a dummy variable, Unaffiliated dummy, which equals one if a 
CTO shares no social network connection with other CTOs, and zero otherwise. 
In Table 6, we use Unaffiliated dummy as the key independent variable of interest. The first 
3 models show that firms with CTOs who share no social network connection with other CTOs 
invest less in innovation, receive fewer patents and fewer citations per patent. The coefficients of 
Unaffiliated dummy are negative and significant at the one percent level. We control for the CTO 
eigenvector centrality of the general network in models 4-6 and the degree centrality of the general 
network in models 7-9. The coefficients of the Unaffiliated dummy stay negative and significant 
in five out of the six models after the CTO centrality proxies are controlled for. In all specifications, 
the coefficients of the CTO centrality variables remain positive and significant. 
3.5. CTO centrality, corporate innovation, and firm valuation  
So far, we have established that firms with high centrality CTOs in both the general network and 
professional network invest more in innovation and receive more well-cited patents. In this section, 
we examine whether those innovation investments enhance firm value. Specifically, we examine 
whether the innovation predicted by the CTO centrality is positively associated with firm valuation 
proxied by Tobin’s q. We first run the regressions in Panel A of Table 3 and obtain the coefficients 
of the centrality variables. Next, we calculate the predicted innovation by multiplying the CTO 
centrality proxies by their corresponding coefficients. We then regress Tobin’s q on the predicted 
innovation. The results are reported in Table 6. The predicted innovation proxies are obtained 
based on the eigenvector centrality from the general network in the first three models and based 
on the degree centrality from the general network in the last three models. Table 6 shows that the 




predicted patent are significant at the one percent level. These results suggest that well-connected 
CTOs engage in value-enhancing and efficient R&D investments. 
3.6. Robustness checks 
One concern is that the success of the innovation allows CTOs to attract more social network 
connections. Specifically, the success of the innovation may lead to more social network 
connections. For example, it is likely that other firms will reach out to the successful CTOs and 
invite them to sit on their board, which increases the CTOs’ social network connections. To address 
this reverse causality issue, we regress the innovation variables three years in the future on the 
current year CTO centrality. The regression is restricted to the subsample where the same CTOs 
remain in the positions for at least three years. The idea is that relative to the dependent variables 
measured three years in the future, the independent variables are largely predetermined. The results 
are reported in Table 8. Panel A reports the results of the general network and Panel B reports the 
results of the professional network. The coefficients of all the centrality measures are positive and 
significant in both Panel A and Panel B, suggesting that our results are unlikely to be driven by 
the reverse causality issue mentioned above. 
 
4. Conclusion 
As one of the top executive positions in a firm, the CTOs’ personal social network connections 
enable them to better evaluate and identify those implementable innovation opportunities. We use 
two proxies for the social network centrality of CTOs, eigenvector centrality and degree centrality, 
both of which are positively correlated with corporate innovation. Specifically, firms with better 




patents receive more citations. In addition, we create network centrality based on two types of 
network, the general network based on the universe of BoardEx and the professional network based 
on the sample of CTOs. We further find that the effects of CTO centrality on corporate innovation 
are not subsumed in CEO centrality. In addition, we find that firms with CTOs who are hired by 
the incumbent CEOs are associated with more innovation activities because CEOs are more willing 
to trust and support the CTOs they hire. As a robust check of our information channel hypothesis, 
we find that firms with CTOs who share no social network connections with other CTOs invest 
less in R&D, receive fewer patents, and attract fewer citations. Finally, we find that the innovation 
predicted by the CTO centrality is associated with better firm performance, suggesting the R&D 
investments are efficient. 
Our work contributes to the social network literature by extending the study of the social 
network of the board of directors and top managers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
paper that examines the social network of CTOs. In addition, our paper contributes to the literature 
that examines the determinates of corporate innovation by showing that CTO centrality is 
positively associated with corporate innovation. We hope our paper will facilitate more research 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables. Firm size is the total assets measured 
in millions of dollars. Tobin’s q is the ratio of market assets to book assets, where market assets 
equal the book value of debt plus the market value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debt to total assets. R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets. 
Patents are the number of patents granted by USPTO. Patent cites are the average patent citations 
each patent has received. The citations are adjusted for truncation bias by multiplying the 
weighting index from the NBER patent database. CTO general degree centrality is the percentile 
of CTO degree centrality calculated based on the universe of BoardEx. CTO general eigenvector 
centrality is the percentile of CTO eigenvector centrality calculated based on the universe of 
BoardEx. CTO professional degree centrality is the percentile of CTO degree centrality calculated 
based on the sample of CTOs. CTO professional eigenvector centrality is the percentile of CTO 
eigenvector centrality calculated based on the sample of CTOs. 
Variables N Mean SD P10 P25 Median P75 P90 
Firm size 11,917  11,309  85,337  4.5  81.3  336.9  1,959  11,600  
Tobin's q 11,449  2.14  2.17  0.16  0.92  1.50  2.57  4.29  
Leverage 11,835  0.18  0.27  0.00  0.00  0.09  0.26  0.46  
R&D 11,915  0.12  0.22  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.14  0.29  
Patents 5,633  16.20  102.80  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  13.00  
Patent cites 5,633  20.51  39.47  0.00  0.00  0.00  25.84  71.88  
CTO general degree 
centrality 
11,917  63.56  24.68  14.00  43.00  67.00  86.00  95.00  
CTO general 
eigenvector centrality 
11,917  66.01  21.93  16.00  49.00  68.00  85.00  93.00  
CTO professional 
degree centrality 
11,917  45.80  32.33  1.00  21.00  48.00  74.00  90.00  
CTO professional 
eigenvector centrality 









Table 2. Correlation 
This table reports the correlation coefficients of the dependent and independent variables. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the total 
assets. Tobin’q is the ratio of market assets to book assets, where market assets equal the book value of debt plus the market value of 
equity. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets. 
Patents are the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents granted by USPTO. Patent cites are the natural logarithm of one plus 
the average number of citations per patent, adjusted for truncation bias. All the centrality variables are the natural logarithm of the 
percentile of the corresponding raw measures. General centrality is measured based on the universe of BoardEx, and professional 
centrality is measured based on the sample of the CTOs.  ***, **, and * indicate significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Firm size 1 
         
(2) Tobin's q -0.26*** 1 
        
(3) Leverage 0.17*** -0.02** 1 
       
(4) R&D -0.42*** 0.31*** -0.00 1 
      
(5) Patents 0.38*** 0.00 0.02 -0.02* 1 
     
(6) Patent cites 0.22*** 0.02 -0.03** 0.04*** 0.79*** 1 
    
(7) CTO general degree 
centrality 
0.33*** -0.02* 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.23*** 0.20*** 1 
   
(8) CTO general eigenvector 
centrality 
0.26*** -0.013 0.01 0.05*** 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.85*** 1 
  
(9) CTO professional degree 
centrality 
0.14*** 0.07*** -0.03*** 0.13*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.70*** 0.63*** 1 
 
(10) CTO professional 
eigenvector centrality 




Table 3. General and Professional Centrality and Corporate Innovation 
The dependent variables are the research and development expenditures to assets ratio (models 1 
and 4), the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents granted by USPTO (models 2 and 
5), and the natural logarithm of one plus the average number of citations per patent (models 3 and 
6), respectively. Panel E and panel F report the results of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regressions. The instrumental variable is the dummy variable which is equal to one if a CTO has 
obtained a graduate degree. All the centrality variables are the natural logarithm of the percentile 
of the corresponding raw measures. General centrality is measured based on the universe of 
BoardEx, and professional centrality is measured based on the sample of the CTOs.  CTO 
centrality of professional network orthg. is the residuals of the regression of CTO general network 
centrality on professional network centrality. CTO degree centrality orthog. is the residuals of the 
regression of CTO eigenvector centrality on degree centrality.  Firm size is the natural logarithm 
of the total assets. Tobin's q is the ratio of market assets to book assets, where market assets equal 
the book value of debt plus the market value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to 
total assets. R&D is the research and development expenditures to assets ratio. Each regression 
includes the year dummies and Fama-French 48 industry dummies. T- statistics based on robust 
standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significant at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Degree and Eigenvector Centrality of General Network 
  A1. Eigenvector Centrality   A2. Degree Centrality  
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 




0.062*** 0.227*** 0.410*** 
   
 
(14.71) (5.99) (7.05) 
    
CTO degree 
centrality 
    
0.052*** 0.162*** 0.327*** 
     
(14.53) (4.88) (6.43) 
Tobin's q 0.020*** 0.052*** 0.041*** 0.020*** 0.052*** 0.041***  
(25.10) (8.01) (4.16) 
 
(24.95) (7.96) (4.09) 
Firm size -0.033*** 0.318*** 0.296*** -0.033*** 0.319*** 0.295***  
(-37.54) (38.96) (23.66) 
 
(-37.52) (38.34) (23.10) 
Leverage 0.050*** -0.201*** -0.366*** 0.050*** -0.200*** -0.361***  
(7.75) (-3.26) (-3.87) 
 









Constant 0.014 -1.288*** -2.206*** 0.067* -0.995*** -1.792***  
(0.35) (-4.15) (-4.63) 
 
(1.74) (-3.32) (-3.91) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.362 0.453 0.333 
 
0.362 0.451 0.331 





Table 3. General and Professional Centrality and Corporate Innovation (Cont.) 
Panel B. Degree and Eigenvector Centrality of Professional Network 
  B1. Eigenvector Centrality   B2. Degree Centrality  
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 




0.013*** 0.047*** 0.089*** 
    
 
(13.03) (5.31) (6.59) 
    
CTO degree 
centrality 
    
0.014*** 0.054*** 0.096*** 
     
(14.01) (6.01) (6.95) 
Tobin's q 0.019*** 0.050*** 0.038*** 
 
0.019*** 0.050*** 0.038***  
(24.57) (7.74) (3.84) 
 
(24.44) (7.66) (3.78) 
Firm size -0.031*** 0.323*** 0.303*** 
 
-0.031*** 0.321*** 0.301***  
(-36.67) (40.36) (24.74) 
 
(-37.02) (39.94) (24.46) 
Leverage 0.053*** -0.197*** -0.356*** 
 
0.053*** -0.196*** -0.357***  
(8.18) (-3.18) (-3.76) 
 









Constant 0.217*** -0.540* -0.864** 
 
0.215*** -0.552** -0.874**  
(5.95) (-1.93) (-2.02) 
 
(5.90) (-1.98) (-2.04) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.360 0.452 0.332 
 
0.361 0.453 0.332 






Table 3. General and Professional Centrality and Corporate Innovation (Cont.) 
Panel C. General and Professional Network 
  C1. Eigenvector Centrality   C2. Degree Centrality  
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 




0.026*** 0.094*** 0.170*** 
 
0.026*** 0.077*** 0.156*** 
 
(14.84) (5.96) (7.01) 
 





0.009*** 0.033** 0.068*** 
 
0.009*** 0.054*** 0.079*** 
 
(5.63) (2.22) (3.04) 
 
(5.66) (3.66) (3.49) 
Tobin's q 0.019*** 0.051*** 0.039*** 
 
0.019*** 0.050*** 0.038***  
(24.71) (7.82) (3.93) 
 
(24.55) (7.68) (3.83) 
Firm size -0.033*** 0.316*** 0.292*** 
 
-0.033*** 0.318*** 0.293***  
(-37.83) (38.55) (23.25) 
 
(-37.50) (38.23) (22.99) 
Leverage 0.052*** -0.195*** -0.353*** 
 
0.052*** -0.194*** -0.352***  
(8.02) (-3.16) (-3.74) 
 









Constant 0.270*** -0.346 -0.504 
 
0.274*** -0.361 -0.500  
(7.44) (-1.24) (-1.18) 
 
(7.54) (-1.29) (-1.17) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.364 0.453 0.334 
 
0.364 0.453 0.333 





Table 3. General and Professional Centrality and Corporate Innovation (Cont.) 
Panel D. Eigenvector and Degree Centrality 
  D1. General Network   D2. Professional Network 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
R&D Patents Patent cites R&D Patents Patent cites 
CTO eigen 
centrality 
0.026*** 0.094*** 0.172*** 
 
0.023*** 0.083*** 0.154*** 
 
(14.84) (5.96) (7.10) 
 




0.007*** -0.004 0.023 
 
0.011*** 0.068*** 0.060*** 
 
(4.09) (-0.27) (0.95) 
 
(6.58) (4.55) (2.62) 
Tobin's q 0.020*** 0.052*** 0.041*** 
 
0.019*** 0.049*** 0.037*** 
 
(24.99) (8.01) (4.13) 
 
(24.36) (7.61) (3.76) 
Firm size -0.033*** 0.319*** 0.294*** 
 
-0.031*** 0.319*** 0.300*** 
 
(-37.68) (38.27) (23.03) 
 
(-37.21) (39.75) (24.36) 
Leverage 0.050*** -0.201*** -0.363*** 
 
0.052*** -0.203*** -0.361*** 
 
(7.77) (-3.27) (-3.84) 
 










Constant 0.276*** -0.358 -0.493 
 
0.258*** -0.397 -0.585 
 
(7.58) (-1.28) (-1.15) 
 
(7.11) (-1.42) (-1.37) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.363 0.452 0.333 
 
0.362 0.454 0.332 






Table 3. General and Professional Centrality and Corporate Innovation (Cont.) 
Panel E. General Network (IV=Graduate Degree) 
  E1. Eigenvector Centrality   E2. Degree Centrality 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 




0.253*** 1.786*** 2.157*** 
    
 
(8.93) (5.65) (4.73) 
    
CTO degree 
centrality 
    
0.213*** 1.506*** 1.818*** 
     
(8.94) (5.66) (4.74) 
Tobin's q 0.018*** 0.045*** 0.033*** 
 
0.018*** 0.041*** 0.029*** 
 
(20.90) (5.93) (3.07) 
 
(20.14) (5.39) (2.65) 
Firm size -0.046*** 0.199*** 0.162*** 
 
-0.048*** 0.185*** 0.146*** 
 
(-21.25) (7.73) (4.38) 
 
(-20.17) (6.62) (3.62) 
Leverage 0.052*** -0.093 -0.245** 
 
0.052*** -0.063 -0.209* 
 
(7.42) (-1.25) (-2.29) 
 










Constant -0.691*** -6.961*** -8.562*** 
 
-0.477*** -5.425*** -6.708*** 
 
(-6.18) (-5.83) (-4.97) 
 
(-5.32) (-5.82) (-4.99) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.245 0.273 0.216 
 
0.247 0.277 0.220 





Table 3. General and Professional Centrality and Corporate Innovation (Cont.) 
Panel F. Professional Network (IV=Graduate Degree) 
  F1. Eigenvector Centrality   F2. Degree Centrality 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 




0.063*** 0.419*** 0.505*** 
    
 
(8.80) (5.61) (4.71) 
    
CTO degree 
centrality 
    
0.064*** 0.430*** 0.519*** 
     
(8.83) (5.62) (4.71) 
Tobin's q 0.016*** 0.030*** 0.015 
 
0.016*** 0.028*** 0.013 
 
(17.10) (3.46) (1.22) 
 
(16.61) (3.24) (1.06) 
Firm size -0.041*** 0.223*** 0.191*** 
 
-0.042*** 0.217*** 0.184*** 
 
(-24.06) (10.17) (6.07) 
 
(-23.53) (9.47) (5.58) 
Leverage 0.066*** -0.037 -0.178 
 
0.064*** -0.049 -0.192* 
 
(9.01) (-0.48) (-1.59) 
 










Constant 0.122*** -1.157*** -1.554*** 
 
0.122*** -1.176*** -1.577*** 
 
(2.89) (-3.36) (-3.14) 
 
(2.89) (-3.41) (-3.18) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.224 0.264 0.210 
 
0.229 0.267 0.210 











Table 4. CTO and CEO Centrality, and Corporate Innovation 
The dependent variables are the research and development expenditures to assets ratio (models 1 
and 4), the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents granted by USPTO (models 2 and 
5), and the natural logarithm of one plus the average number of citations per patent (models 3 and 
6). The centrality variables are the natural logarithm of the percentile of the corresponding raw 
measures. Panel A reports the results of the general network and Panel B reports the results of the 
professional network. General network centrality is measured based on the universe of BoardEx, 
and professional network centrality is measured based on the sample of the CTOs.  CEO centrality 
orthog. is the residuals of the regression of CTO network centrality on the corresponding CEO 
network centrality. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the total assets. Tobin’s q is the ratio of 
market assets to book assets, where market assets equal the book value of debt plus the market 
value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. R&D is the research and 
development expenditures to assets ratio. Each regression includes the year dummies and Fama-
French 48 industry dummies. T- statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in the 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. General Network 
  A1. Eigenvector Centrality   A2. Degree Centrality  
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6)  
R&D Patents Patent 
cites 
  R&D Patents Patent cites 
CTO centrality 0.016*** 0.118*** 0.201*** 
 
0.010*** 0.097*** 0.153***  
(7.77) (3.78) (4.38) 
 
(3.12) (3.06) (3.24) 
CEO centrality 
orthog. 
0.010*** 0.043 0.077** 
 
0.009*** 0.064** 0.085** 
 
(5.80) (1.40) (2.12) 
 
(3.49) (2.18) (2.31) 
Tobin's q 0.012*** 0.077*** 0.046** 
 
0.012*** 0.076*** 0.044**  
(3.72) (4.75) (2.34) 
 
(3.72) (4.72) (2.28) 
Firm size -0.021*** 0.417*** 0.308*** 
 
-0.020*** 0.418*** 0.314***  
(-13.14) (19.73) (13.63) 
 
(-13.32) (19.34) (13.56) 
Leverage -0.005 -0.337* -0.435* 
 
-0.006 -0.341* -0.430*  
(-0.40) (-1.85) (-1.95) 
 









Constant 0.202*** 0.164 0.356 
 
0.193*** 0.143 0.290  
(13.51) (0.37) (0.74) 
 
(12.95) (0.32) (0.60) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.252 0.543 0.384 
 
0.243 0.543 0.381 






Table 4. CTO and CEO Centrality, and Corporate Innovation (Cont.) 
Panel B. Professional Network 
  A1. Eigenvector Centrality   A2. Degree Centrality 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6)  




0.013*** 0.082*** 0.159*** 
 
0.013*** 0.096*** 0.154*** 
 
(6.67) (3.00) (3.81) 
 




0.014*** 0.069** 0.118*** 
 
0.009*** 0.068** 0.092** 
 
(6.52) (2.12) (3.12) 
 
(3.08) (2.24) (2.44) 
Tobin's q 0.012*** 0.076*** 0.043** 
 
0.012*** 0.075*** 0.042**  
(3.69) (4.65) (2.19) 
 
(3.68) (4.61) (2.15) 
Firm size -0.020*** 0.420*** 0.310*** 
 
-0.020*** 0.417*** 0.313***  
(-13.33) (19.78) (13.79) 
 
(-13.35) (19.64) (13.73) 
Leverage -0.004 -0.337* -0.429* 
 
-0.004 -0.336* -0.421*  
(-0.32) (-1.85) (-1.93) 
 









Constant 0.202*** 0.166 0.385 
 
0.195*** 0.161 0.319  
(13.99) (0.37) (0.80) 
 
(13.51) (0.36) (0.66) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.252 0.542 0.384 
 
0.248 0.543 0.382 




Table 5. CTO Hired by CEO and Corporate Innovation 
The dependent variables are the research and development expenditures to assets ratio (models 1 
and 4), the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents granted by USPTO (models 2 and 
5), and the natural logarithm of one plus the average number of citations per patent (models 3 and 
6), respectively. CTO hired by CEO is a dummy variable which equals one is a CTO is hired by 
the incumbent CEO. Centrality* Hired dummy is the interaction of CTO centrality and CTO hired 
by CEO. The centrality variables are the natural logarithm of the percentile of the corresponding 
raw measures. General centrality is measured based on the universe of BoardEx, and professional 
centrality is measured based on the sample of the CTOs. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the 
total assets. Tobin’s q is the ratio of market assets to book assets, where market assets equal the 
book value of debt plus the market value of equity.  Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets. R&D is the research and development expenditures to assets ratio. Each regression includes 
the year dummies and Fama-French 48 industry dummies. T- statistics based on robust standard 
errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A. General Network, Eigenvector Centrality  
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6)  




0.062*** 0.233*** 0.413*** 
 
0.062*** 0.222*** 0.406*** 
 
(13.88) (7.24) (7.40) 
 
(13.81) (6.95) (7.27) 
CTO hired by 
CEO 
0.008*** 0.351*** 0.250*** 
    
 
(2.75) (6.99) (3.89) 
    
Centrality* 
Hired dummy 
    
0.002*** 0.089*** 0.059*** 
     
(3.21) (7.18) (3.82) 
Tobin's q 0.020*** 0.051*** 0.041*** 
 
0.020*** 0.050*** 0.040***  
(7.63) (8.08) (4.08) 
 
(7.63) (8.06) (4.07) 
Firm size -0.033*** 0.296*** 0.281*** 
 
-0.033*** 0.294*** 0.280***  
(-24.32) (25.68) (21.74) 
 
(-24.33) (25.54) (21.62) 
Leverage 0.050** -0.181*** -0.352*** 
 
0.050** -0.181*** -0.353***  
(2.24) (-3.37) (-4.44) 
 









Constant 0.016 -1.262*** -2.187*** 
 
0.017 -1.215*** -2.157***  
(0.61) (-3.03) (-4.83) 
 
(0.67) (-2.94) (-4.77) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.363 0.460 0.334 
 
0.363 0.461 0.334 




Table 5. CTO Hired by CEO and Corporate Innovation (Cont.) 
Panel B. General Network, Degree Centrality 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)  




0.052*** 0.163*** 0.327*** 
 
0.052*** 0.154*** 0.322*** 
 
(12.31) (5.88) (6.69) 
 
(12.24) (5.58) (6.57) 
CTO hired by 
CEO 
0.007** 0.348*** 0.244*** 
    
 
(2.47) (6.91) (3.79) 
    
Centrality* 
Hired dummy 
    
0.002*** 0.089*** 0.057*** 
     
(2.97) (7.11) (3.69) 
Tobin's q 0.020*** 0.051*** 0.040*** 
 
0.020*** 0.050*** 0.040*** 
 
(7.63) (8.04) (4.03) 
 
(7.63) (8.01) (4.01) 
Firm size -0.033*** 0.298*** 0.280*** 
 
-0.033*** 0.295*** 0.279*** 
 
(-24.27) (25.53) (21.16) 
 
(-24.27) (25.35) (21.01) 
Leverage 0.050** -0.181*** -0.348*** 
 
0.050** -0.180*** -0.348***  
(2.25) (-3.36) (-4.39) 
 










Constant 0.068*** -0.953** -1.762*** 
 
0.069*** -0.914** -1.740*** 
 
(2.87) (-2.34) (-4.12) 
 
(2.92) (-2.27) (-4.08) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.362 0.459 0.333 
 
0.362 0.460 0.333 




Table 5. CTO Hired by CEO and Corporate Innovation (Cont.) 
Panel C. Professional Network, Eigenvector Centrality 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 






0.013*** 0.047*** 0.089*** 
 
0.013*** 0.033*** 0.081*** 
 
(12.99) (6.27) (6.87) 
 
(12.51) (4.32) (6.16) 
CTO hired by 
CEO 
0.007** 0.347*** 0.241*** 
    
 
(2.52) (6.90) (3.76) 
    
Centrality* 
Hired dummy 
    
0.002** 0.114*** 0.068*** 
     
(2.11) (7.78) (3.85) 
Tobin's q 0.019*** 0.049*** 0.037*** 
 
0.019*** 0.048*** 0.037*** 
 
(7.49) (7.85) (3.80) 
 
(7.49) (7.77) (3.75) 
Firm size -0.031*** 0.302*** 0.289*** 
 
-0.031*** 0.295*** 0.287*** 
 
(-24.34) (26.46) (22.69) 
 
(-24.20) (26.01) (22.32) 
Leverage 0.053** -0.178*** -0.343*** 
 
0.053** -0.180*** -0.346*** 
 
(2.37) (-3.30) (-4.35) 
 










Constant 0.218*** -0.494 -0.832** 
 
0.219*** -0.428 -0.797* 
 
(10.47) (-1.20) (-1.97) 
 
(10.49) (-1.07) (-1.90) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.360 0.459 0.333 
 
0.360 0.463 0.334 




Table 5. CTO Hired by CEO and Corporate Innovation (Cont.) 
Panel D. Professional Network, Degree Centrality 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)  





0.014*** 0.054*** 0.096*** 
 
0.014*** 0.039*** 0.088*** 
 
(13.62) (7.10) (7.18) 
 
(13.13) (5.10) (6.50) 
CTO hired by 
CEO 
0.007** 0.347*** 0.242*** 
    
 
(2.48) (6.91) (3.78) 
    
Centrality* 
Hired dummy 
    
0.002** 0.120*** 0.065*** 
     
(2.03) (7.88) (3.65) 
Tobin's q 0.019*** 0.049*** 0.037*** 
 
0.019*** 0.048*** 0.037***  
(7.45) (7.78) (3.74) 
 
(7.45) (7.69) (3.70) 
Firm size -0.032*** 0.299*** 0.286*** 
 
-0.032*** 0.291*** 0.285***  
(-24.50) (26.30) (22.41) 
 
(-24.36) (25.78) (22.06) 
Leverage 0.053** -0.176*** -0.344*** 
 
0.053** -0.179*** -0.348***  
(2.36) (-3.28) (-4.36) 
 









Constant 0.216*** -0.506 -0.842** 
 
0.217*** -0.445 -0.816*  
(10.37) (-1.24) (-2.01) 
 
(10.38) (-1.13) (-1.96) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.361 0.460 0.334 
 
0.361 0.465 0.334 








Table 6. Unaffiliated CTOs and Corporation Innovation 
The dependent variables are the research and development expenditures to assets ratio (models 1 and 4), the natural logarithm of one 
plus the number of patents granted by USPTO (models 2 and 5), and the natural logarithm of one plus the average number of citations 
per patent (models 3 and 6), respectively. Unaffiliated dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if a CTO shares no social network 
connection with other CTOs. All the centrality variables are the natural logarithm of the percentile of the corresponding raw measures. 
General centrality is measured based on the universe of BoardEx, and professional centrality is measured based on the sample of the 
CTOs. Control variables include Firm size, Tobin’s q, and Leverage. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the total assets. Tobin’s q is 
the ratio of market assets to book assets, where market assets equal the book value of debt plus the market value of equity. Leverage is 
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. R&D is the research and development expenditures to assets ratio. Each regression includes 
the year dummies and Fama-French 48 industry dummies. T- statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. 
***, **, and * indicate significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
R&D Patents Patent cites R&D Patents Patent cites R&D Patents Patent cites 
Unaffiliated dummy -0.047*** -0.150*** -0.309*** -0.023*** -0.055 -0.152** -0.019*** -0.072* -0.156**  
(-11.48) (-4.91) (-5.89) (-4.95) (-1.58) (-2.51) (-3.78) (-1.92) (-2.40) 
CTO eigenvector 
centrality 
   
0.051*** 0.198*** 0.330*** 
   
    
(9.94) (5.36) (5.11) 
   
CTO degree centrality 
      
0.043*** 0.124*** 0.245***        













Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.357 0.451 0.330 0.364 0.453 0.333 0.363 0.451 0.332 




Table 7. Corporate Innovation and Firm Performance 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q is the ratio of market assets to book assets, where 
market assets equal the book value of total debt plus the market value of equity. The predicted 
R&D, predicted patents, and predicted cites are the coefficients of the centrality variables obtained 
from panel A of Table 3 multiplied by their corresponding centrality value. Firm size is the natural 
logarithm of the total assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Capex is the 
ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. ROA is the ratio of income before extraordinary items 
to total assets. Each regression includes the year dummies and Fama-French 48 industry dummies. 
T- statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Eigenvector Centrality   Degree Centrality   




























   
0.739*** 
   
(2.80) 
   
(3.84) 
Firm size -0.190*** -0.187*** -0.187*** 
 
-0.132*** -0.196*** -0.196***  
(-19.14) (-10.58) (-10.58) 
 
(-11.82) (-10.95) (-10.95) 
Leverage 0.213*** 0.242* 0.242* 
 
0.270*** 0.253* 0.253*  
(2.67) (1.76) (1.76) 
 
(3.37) (1.84) (1.84) 
Capex 1.054*** 1.836*** 1.836*** 
 
2.470*** 1.810*** 1.810***  
(2.63) (2.73) (2.73) 
 
(5.78) (2.69) (2.69) 
ROA -0.767*** -0.366*** -0.366*** 
 
-0.706*** -0.368*** -0.368***  
(-18.86) (-5.40) (-5.40) 
 
(-17.29) (-5.45) (-5.45) 
Constant 2.512*** 2.895*** 2.895*** 
 
3.081*** 2.816*** 2.816***  
(12.88) (4.30) (4.30) 
 
(6.78) (4.35) (4.35) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.102 0.145 0.145 
 
0.172 0.146 0.146 





Table 8. Addressing the Reverse Causality Concern 
The dependent variables are the research and development expenditure to assets ratio (models 1 
and 4), the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents granted by USPTO (models 2 and 
5), and the natural logarithm of one plus the average number of citations per patent (models 3 and 
6), respectively. All the dependent variables are measured 3 years in the future. All the centrality 
variables are the natural logarithm of the percentile of the corresponding raw measures. Control 
variables include Firm size, Tobin’s q, and Leverage. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the total 
assets. Tobin’s q is the ratio of market assets to book assets, where market assets equal the book 
value of total debt plus the market value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets. R&D is the research and development expenditures to assets ratio. Each regression includes 
the year dummies and Fama-French 48 industry dummies. T- statistics based on robust standard 
errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A. Centrality of General Network 
  A1. Eigenvector Centrality   A2. Degree Centrality  
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 





0.042*** 0.115** 0.214** 
    
 
(7.11) (2.06) (2.06) 
    
CTO degree 
centrality 
    
0.032*** 0.088* 0.203** 
     
(6.03) (1.76) (2.18) 
Tobin's q 0.005*** 0.032*** 0.038** 
 
0.005*** 0.032*** 0.038**  
(4.65) (3.25) (2.11) 
 
(4.57) (3.24) (2.07) 
Firm size -0.022*** 0.240*** 0.317*** 
 
-0.022*** 0.241*** 0.314***  
(-16.36) (17.60) (12.52) 
 
(-15.92) (17.52) (12.33) 
Leverage -0.033*** 0.121 0.057 
 
-0.034*** 0.118 0.056  
(-2.77) (1.13) (0.29) 
 









Constant 0.057 0.127 -0.239 
 
0.103** 0.244 -0.152  
(1.14) (0.29) (-0.29) 
 
(2.13) (0.57) (-0.19) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.314 0.401 0.336 
 
0.312 0.401 0.336 




Table 8. Addressing the Reverse Causality Concern (Cont.) 
Panel B. Centrality of Professional Network 
  B1. Eigenvector Centrality   B2. Degree Centrality  
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
  F3.R&D F3.Patents F3.Patent 
cites 





0.011*** 0.031** 0.053** 
    
 
(8.02) (2.28) (2.12) 
    
CTO degree 
centrality 
    
0.013*** 0.034** 0.056** 
     
(8.82) (2.49) (2.17) 
Tobin's q 0.005*** 0.031*** 0.038** 
 
0.004*** 0.031*** 0.037**  
(4.17) (3.20) (2.07) 
 
(4.04) (3.16) (2.05) 
Firm size -0.022*** 0.241*** 0.320*** 
 
-0.022*** 0.240*** 0.319***  
(-16.45) (18.16) (12.99) 
 
(-16.76) (18.02) (12.91) 
Leverage -0.034*** 0.118 0.049 
 
-0.034*** 0.118 0.048  
(-2.89) (1.10) (0.25) 
 









Constant 0.195*** 0.500 0.459 
 
0.192*** 0.492 0.450  
(4.35) (1.26) (0.62) 
 
(4.29) (1.24) (0.61) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.317 0.402 0.336 
 
0.319 0.402 0.336 





In my dissertation, I examined how managers acquire their skills from the perspectives of their 
prior on-job training in the PE target firms, supply chains, and the social network connections of 
the managers. 
 In my first essay, my findings reveal that CEOs of public firms who previously assumed 
the CEO position in the PE buyout targets display managing styles that are similar to those of PE. 
I first find that these CEOs implement strong cost cutting initiatives: They cut capital expenditures 
and employment within five years after they take office. I further show that these CEOs enhance 
patent values, result in higher Tobin’s, and increase leverage. Overall, my results suggest that PE 
has spillover effects on public firms through the experiences public firms’ CEOs acquired when 
they previously served as CEOs in PE targets. 
 In my second essay, I find evidence that suggests that after CEO successions in customer 
firms, the improved managerial ability of the new customer CEO is positively correlated with 
better subsequent managerial ability and higher total efficiency of the supplier. I further find that 
the supplier’s earnings quality, credit ratings, leverage, and firm performance are positively 
correlated with the customer’s managerial ability. Overall, my findings are consistent with the 
view that customer’s managerial ability has a spillover effect on their suppliers. 
 In my third essay, I find that firms with better connected CTOs invest more in R&D and 
receive more and higher quality patents. In addition, I find that those effects are stronger if the 
CTOs are hired by the CEOs. My results collectively suggest that CTOs can acquire valuable 
information through social network connections. 
